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AI ENTITIES AS AI AGENTS: ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE LIABILITY AND THE AI
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR ANALOGY
Anat Lior*
ABSTRACT
Artificial Intelligence (AI) based entities are already causing damages
and fatalities in today’s commercial world. As a result, the dispute about tort
liability of AI-based machines, algorithms, agents, and robots is exponentially
advancing in the scholarly world and outside of it. When it comes to AI
accidents, different scholars and key figures in the AI industry advocate for
different liability regimes. This ever-growing disagreement is condemning this
new emergent technology, soon to be found in almost every home and street
in the US and around the world, into a realm of regulatory uncertainty. This
obstructs our ability to fully enjoy the many benefits AI has to offer us as
consumers and as a society.
This Article advocates for the adoption and application of a strict
liability regime on current and future AI accidents. It does so by delving into
and exploring the realm of legal analogies in the AI context and promoting the
agency analogy, and subsequently, the respondeat superior doctrine. This
Article explains and justifies why the agency analogy is the best-suited one in
contrast to other analogies which have been suggested in the context of AI
liability (e.g., products, animals, electronic persons and even slaves). As a
result, the intuitive application of the respondeat superior doctrine provides
the AI industry with a much-needed underlying liability regime which will
enable it to continue to evolve in the years to come, and its victims to receive
remedy once accidents occur.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The conundrum of Artificial Intelligence (AI) liability has become
a real-life problem in society today. Scenarios that were once only
plausible in science fiction novels and movies 1 are now transfusing
themselves into our routine lives, causing manifold legal and social
challenges. We are still far from the ominous scenario in which the
machines take over humanity. 2 Nonetheless, today, AI-based robots and
algorithms can and do inflict physical and non-physical damages upon
us as a society and as individuals, while the legal approach to handling
these damages is highly disputed. 3

*J.S.D. Candidate at Yale Law School, Resident Fellow with the School’s Information
Society Project. I would like to deeply thank Professor Jack Balkin for his guidance and
help through the different stages of this article; Professors Guido Calabresi and Daniel
Markovitz for their comments; as well as participants at the Yale Information Society
Project Fellows Writing Workshop; the Yale Law School J.S.D. Colloquium
Workshop; and the 23rd UBC Interdisciplinary Legal Studies Graduate Innovation in
Law and Policy Conference.
See, e.g., ISAAC ASIMOV, I, ROBOT (1950) (detailing fictional history of robotics); 2001:
A SPACE ODYSSEY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1968) (imaging a world in which a space ship
computer system, HAL, rebels against human astronauts); THE MATRIX (Warner Bros.
1999) (describing a world in which an artificial intelligence character, known as Agent
Smith, keeps order in Matrix system by terminating troublesome programs and
humans); THE TERMINATOR (Hemdale 1984) (envisioning a cyborg assassin, known as
the Terminator, sent from the future by self-aware artificial intelligence program
Skynet); HER (Annapurna Pictures 2013) (imaging a scenario where a man falls in love
with Samantha, his operating system).
See, e.g., NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGEROUS, STRATEGIES
(2014) (arguing that if machine brains surpass human brains in general intelligence, this
new superintelligence could replace humans as the dominant lifeform on Earth).
See Jack M. Balkin, The Path of Robotics Law, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 45 (2015)
(describing key problems that robotics present for law and exploring solutions). See
generally, UGO PAGALLO, THE LAWS OF ROBOTS: CRIMES, CONTRACTS, AND TORTS
(2013) (exploring how the design, construction, and use of robotics technology may
affect today’s legal systems and matters of responsibility and agency in criminal law,
contractual obligations, and torts).
1

2

3

2020]

AI ENTITIES AS AI AGENTS

1045

This Article attempts to diffuse this dispute by arguing that society
should understand and treat AI machines, robots, agents, and
algorithms (hereinafter “AI entities” 4) as instruments of humans created
and designed for the mono-purpose of being utilized by humans for
their own personal benefit. A suitable analogy for AI entities must reflect
its regulatory purposes. When tort law and AI collide, the appropriate
regulatory goal will lead us to recognize and treat AI entities as AI
judgment-proof agents, given their instrumental role in society’s modern
life. 5 This strongly suggests the adoption of the agency structure as the
appropriate legal analogy in the AI context. In a relationship between
an agent and its principal, the former is authorized to act on behalf of
the latter for various purposes. 6 This Article claims the human principal
is responsible for the damages caused by its AI agent given the
respondeat superior doctrine manifested via the nature of their
relationship.
The correlation between the way we view AI entities and the way
we choose to analogize them—and the analogy of agency for which this
Article advocates—can be viewed as creating a reinforcement circle, akin
to Rawls’s reflective equilibrium. 7 Reflective equilibrium manifests itself
in the context of analogical reasoning in law through the process of
reasoning from a particular moral judgment (i.e., particular cases) to a
general one (i.e., a general theory) and back again, while both particular
and general principles are adjusting and readjusting due to their mutual
influence. 8 In an AI context, this process leads to the adoption of the
analogy of agency given its ability to adjust itself to different
circumstances and relationships in particular cases, and thus adapt the
general theory to conform to these particular judgments. 9
Human judgment-proof agents and AI judgment-proof agents (AI
agents) share similar liability difficulties when damages occur. In both
cases, the agent will not be held liable for the result of an accident, and
his or her (or its) principal will step in as the liable party, while the agent
vanishes from the legal liability picture. 10 Note that the use of the term
The use of the phrase “AI entities” is derived from its relative neutrality. AI entities are
not always robots nor are they algorithms. For more on this, see infra Section IV.A.
Daniel Carvell et al., Accidental Death and the Rule of Joint and Several Liability, 43
RAND J. ECON. 51,52–54 (2012).
See infra Part III, Section C; Part IV.
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48–53 (1971).
Larry Alexander, The Banality of Legal Reasoning, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 517, 518
(1998).
See Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 750–754
(1993) (discussing the theory of reflective equilibrium in the context of analogical
reasoning).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03 (AM. LAW. INST. 2006) (describing
when a principal is liable to a third party harmed by an agent’s conduct); see also Will
Kenton,
Judgment
Proof,
INVESTOPEDIA
(June
12,
2018),
4

5

6
7
8

9
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1046

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:5

“agent” in this sense does not attribute any human-like rights or
obligations to the AI entity. On the contrary, the usage of the term
“agent” in the context of this Article rejects the notion that AI entities
should be held liable. When it comes to identifying the liable party, the
AI agent is replaced by its human principal.
The other analogies that will be presented in this Article are
products, animals (domesticated and wild), slaves, electronic persons,
and a grander analogy to the aviation and vaccination industries. 11 These
analogies are only appropriate in the context of a full agency
relationship, which is not the case when it comes to AI entities. Nonagency legal analogies are reduced to the basic problem of judgmentproof agency, where an AI entity cannot be held liable and so a human
guardian, keeper, custodian, or owner must be found liable instead in
order to provide a remedy. 12 In these cases, the identity of that
accountable human is reduced to that of a principal (or principals) in
control of the AI agent. 13 The usage of the above non-agency legal
analogies in the AI context leads to the agency structure of a principal,
an agent, and a victim. 14 While the precise technical definition of
“principal” may vary, those in control of AI entities will still be held
liable for the actions of their AI entity. 15
Recovery is only possible via an AI agent’s human principals
because AI agents are effectively judgment proof. This is because these
principals are the only entity the regulator can properly incentivize to
prevent damages and to invest in achieving an optimal level of activity. 16
The AI agent is not transparent to the victim because the latter cannot
take any preventive measures to protect herself when confronted with a
harmful AI agent. 17 The principal is the one best suited to take proactive
actions to prevent potential accidents and damages, to insure it, and to
attain the optimal level of activity for the AI agent. 18
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/j/judgment-proof.asp
[https://perma.cc/34G4GMPG] (describing what it means for a human to be judgment-proof).
See infra Part III.
See Sam N. Lehman-Wilzig, Frankenstein Unbound: Towards a Legal Definition of
Artificial Intelligence, 13 FUTURES 442, 451 (1981) (explaining how the law of agency is
a useful framework for thinking about liability as it relates to AI); see also infra Part III,
Section C.
See Lehman-Wilzig, supra note 12, at 451; see also infra Part III, Section C.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV, Section B.
See Harold Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 112 (1916)
[hereinafter Laski] (“If we allow the master to be careless of his servant’s torts we lose
hold upon the most valuable check in the conduct of social life.”).
Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J.
1217, 1222 (2017) (discussing the asymmetry of information between AI and end user
and arguing this creates a fiduciary relationship).
See Laski, supra note 16, at 114 (“If [the principal] is compelled to bear the burden
of his servant’s torts even when he himself is personally without fault, it is because in a
11
12

13
14
15
16

17
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In using AI agents as instruments, human beings in practice,
advertently or inadvertently, impose risks on each other. These agents
cannot be viewed as entities capable of assuming legal responsibilities,
but are merely a device in the hands of the principal. 19 Building on the
example made by Professor Balkin—the Rabbi is the principal behind
Golem, the judgment-proof agent, and is therefore liable for any
damages caused by the agent. 20
The Article continues as follows. In Part II, the Article will provide
a review of the concept of legal analogies in the AI context and the
justifications for and against the application of this reasoning method. 21
Part III delves into the legal analogies offered in the AI context—
property (products, domesticated and wild animals, and slaves),
personhood (i.e., electronic persons), agency, and the aviation and
vaccination industries—and explains how these legal analogies can all be
reduced to the legal structure of agency. 22 Part IV establishes the
important connection between treating AI entities as agents and the
implication of this policy decision on the appropriate liability regime
applicable to human principals of AI agents. 23 Part IV will also discuss,
inter alia, the applicability of the respondeat superior doctrine on AI
agents and the identity of the principal or principals. 24
II. THE USE OF LEGAL ANALOGIES
“Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as
devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it.” 25 Even though
Judge Benjamin Cardozo wrote this statement in 1926, the notion that
stands behind it still echoes in today’s legal reasoning process, especially
with regards to new technologies. We yearn for legal analogies, fictions,
and metaphors to illuminate the unknown when it intersects with the
social distribution of profit and loss, the balance of least disturbance seems thereby best
to be obtained.”).
Balkin, supra note 17, at 1230 (arguing that “[t]he owner of a fiduciary duty is not the
robot. It is the company that manufactures, installs, sells, and operates the robot”).
Id. at 1222.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (AM. LAW. INST. 2006) (“An employer
is subject to liability for torts committed by employees while acting within the scope of
their employment.”); id. § 7.07(1) (describing when an employee is acting within the
scope of employment); see also infra Part IV, Sections B–C.
Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926); see also A. Michael
Froomkin, The Metaphor is Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the
Constitution, 143 U. PENN. L. REV. 709, 860 (1995) (“Nevertheless, the observation that
‘[t]he power of a metaphor is that it colors and controls our subsequent thinking about
its subject’ is particularly relevant and powerful when the law encounters a new
technology.”).
19

20
21
22
23
24

25
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law. 26 While these wise words are of particular relevance in the context
of emerging and proliferating technologies, especially AI, the warning
embedded in them should be taken with a grain of salt.

A. Legal Analogies and the Law
Analogies play an important role when it comes to legal reasoning. 27
Using legal analogical reasoning is based on finding a unifying normative
principle. This principle validates the comparison one is trying to
establish, based on similarities or differences between the new subject
matter and the familiar subject matter, upon which the analogy is
based. 28 While Dworkin rightly states that “analogy without theory is
blind,” 29 it is also true that using an inaccurate or inappropriate theory
may be myopic. 30 In order to reach a conclusion based on a proposed
analogy, a well-thought-out theory and correlative principle must stand
behind it. This is especially true when we discuss a technological
advancement unlike anything we have encountered before. 31 It is
important to note that the usage of analogy is inherently and inevitably
evaluative. 32 The chosen analogy will eventually shape the desired
applicable legal rules. 33
The words “analogy,” “fiction,” and “metaphor” will be used interchangeably in Part
II of this Article because the referenced works do the same. However, subsequent
sections will exclusively use the word “analogy,” as it is the most accurate for this article’s
purpose. See generally Jacob M. Carpenter, Persuading with Precedent: Understanding
and Improving Analogies in Legal Argument, 44 CAP. U. L. REV. 461, 471 (2016)
(discussing the difference between legal analogies and legal metaphors).
See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967); PIERRE OLIVIER, LEGAL FICTIONS
IN PRACTICE AND LEGAL SCIENCE (1975); LEGAL FICTIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
(Maksymilian Del Mar & William Twinig eds., 2015); Kenneth Campbell, Fuller on
Legal Fictions, 2 L. & PHIL. 339 (1983); Louise Harmon, Falling Off The Vine: Legal
Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1 (1990); Daniel
Klerman, Legal Fictions as Strategic Instruments (UC Berkeley: Berkeley Program in
Law and Economics, 2009); Nancy J. Knauer, Legal Fictions and Juristic Truth, 23 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. (2010); Ben W. Palmer, Legal Fictions and Red Room Wine: An
Excursion into History, 38 A.B.A. J. (1953); Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO.
L.J. 1435 (2007); Aviam Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 GA. L. REV. 871 (1986).
Cass R. Sunstein, Of Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 29, 32 (2001); see also Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics,
Pragmatics and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV.
923 (1996).
Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 353, 371 (1997).
Peter de Marneffe, But Does Theory Lead to Better Legal Decisions?: Response to
Ronald Dworkin’s In Praise of Theory, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 427, 428 (1997).
Ryan Calo, Robots as Legal Metaphors, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 209, 215 (2016)
(arguing that it is an intuitive part of the legal reasoning process to turn to legal analogies
in an attempt to find the best-suited legal analogy for new phenomena in a specific legal
context, particularly in the context of robots).
Sunstein, supra note 28, at 31.
26

27

28

29
30

31

32
33

Id.
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It is hard to find an analogy that is not colored by the attitudes of
the person proposing and evaluating it. The proponent is trying to
generate a principle that best justifies her proposal, but there is more
than one principle, in the form of a regulatory purpose, which is
available per instance. It is a normative policy decision, rather than a
question of similarity or dissimilarity, to support one principle over the
other. This generation of competing principles for analogical reasoning
is an important part of how we face new and convoluted phenomena, 34
by applying what we know and its underlying legal principle to
something we have yet to master. 35
The process of choosing the appropriate legal analogy is based
upon a back-and-forth reasoning between the available analogies at hand
and the regulatory purposes that they are based upon. 36 This process
analyzes the nature of the problem in front of us, which is the impetus
for embarking on this reasoning voyage. In an AI context, the nature of
the problem is the ever-growing instances of AI entities inflicting
physical injuries and non-physical damages upon society, individuals,
and property, with no direct human party that can be named as liable
given the unpredictable nature of these entities. 37
After identifying the problem, we must evaluate the principles and
values at stake, which will guide us in our dialectical reasoning journey
between the proposed analogies. 38 An analogy on its own cannot tell us
which two sets of cases are more similar (e.g. why X is more like Y than
Z). Only a theory based on the principles and values at stake can address
this task. 39 This process will lead us to an appropriate solution based on
a theory consistent with the regulatory purposes we set up for ourselves. 40
It will also enable us to articulate the important principles we wish to
pursue. 41 This process of reasoning is akin to Rawls’s reflective
equilibrium. 42 It suggests a process which is in constant movement
Id. at 34 (stating that as soon as they possess evaluative capabilities, computer programs
and AI will be able to do this analogical reasoning by themselves).
The basic principle of using existing knowledge to analyze what will come is immensely
important in the field of AI and machine learning, and it lays the foundation for its
predictive purposes. It is interesting to see, therefore, how this principle is also significant
in the process of cherry-picking the appropriate analogy.
Sunstein, supra note 28, at 32–33.
Jin Yoshikawa, Sharing the Costs of Artificial Intelligence: Universal No-Fault Social
Insurance for Personal Injuries, 21 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1155, 1162–63 (2019).
Dworkin, supra note 29, at 355–57.
Id. at 371–72; Larry Alexander, Bad Beginnings, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 57, 83 (1996).
Dworkin, supra note 29, at 357.
34

35

36
37

38
39
40

Id.
See RAWLS, supra note 7, at 48; Emily Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical Reasoning
in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179, 1181 (1999). An example of utilizing the reflective
equilibrium process can be found in the proposal for an “analogy breaker.” See Luke
M. Milligan, Analogy Breakers: A Reality Check on Emerging Technologies, 80 MISS.
41
42

L.J. 1319, 1320 (2011). Milligan discusses the intersection of criminal procedure and
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between general principles and specific cases. 43 It uses experience and a
continual loop of attempts and failures in order to investigate, reach, and
eventually achieve the desired equilibrium between the general
principals we as a society hold, and the specific ones that arise in
idiosyncratic cases. 44
The best analogy will not present itself problem-free. Every analogy
comes with its unique deficiencies because it is an attempt to impose a
relationship on two different things—it is just an analogy and is not
identical to the subject at hand. 45 The question is, whether this deficiency
undermines the applicability of the analogy as a whole, i.e., the general
principle of reflective equilibrium, or creates a productive situation in
the form of a manageable problem. 46 This problem will be resolved
using the same back-and-forth reasoning which led us to that specific
analogy in the first place. 47
An example of the reflective equilibrium voyage can be seen with
the emergence of the internet and the World Wide Web at the end of
the last century. This once-new phenomenon presented, and still

cyberspace technology. Id. He offers the implementation of a doctrinal test called
“analogy breaker,” which allows courts to identify misleading functional analogies by
“breaking” the analogy and directing their resources back to the practical implications
of the new technology. Id. This could also be of value in a tort context to make sure the
chosen analogy is substantially similar to, or different from, the technology in use, and
more importantly, that it aligns with our regulatory purposes. The “analogy breaker”
suggestion essentially utilizes Rawls’s reflective equilibrium because it uses specific cases
decided by the courts to help enforce our general understanding and values at stake
relative to AI entities and their role in our society. Once an analogy is “broken” by court
in a specific case, it has failed to reach the appropriate equilibrium we seek in order to
reconcile our values with our practices, thus, reinforcing the back and forth reasoning
process in pursuit of the best analogy.
Brewer, supra note 28, at 927–28.
See Robert Justin Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, Foundationalism and the New
Fuzziness: The Role of Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Legal Theory, 75 CORNELL L.
REV. 810, 868–70 (1990); Brewer, supra note 28, at 927, 938–39. “Perhaps the most
important of these unrecognized analogical arguments is the argument that proceeds by
effecting a ‘reflective equilibrium’ between general norms and particular applications of
those norms.” Id. at 927–28. The method of reflective equilibrium is not the only path
available when discussing the process of choosing legal analogies, but it is the most
practical one in the context of this Article. Dan Hunter, Reason is Too Large: Analogy
and Precedent in Law, 50 EMORY L.J. 1197, 1250–63 (2001) (reviewing other methods).
See Sherwin, supra note 42, at 1183–84 (discussing objections to the analogical
method).
RAWLS, supra note 7, at 53 (“We should view a theory of justice as a guiding framework
designed to focus our moral sensibilities and to put before our intuitive capacities more
limited and manageable questions for judgment.”) (emphasis added).
Part III, Section A.1 gives an example of an analogy that failed in light of its deficiencies
(AI entities as animals), and Part IV, Section B gives one that did not—AI entities as
judgment-proof agents, which presents a productive problem in the form of choosing
the appropriate human principal.
43
44

45

46

47
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presents, various new legal challenges. 48 A few analogies were suggested
based on existing legal rules in an attempt to identify a suitable one. First,
the internet can be viewed as a conduit of information, similar to a series
of tubes or a superhighway upon which information travels at high
speed. 49 Second, the internet can be viewed as a novel space, usually
referred to as cyberspace, which suggests that the internet resembles a
specific geographic space. 50 Third, the internet can be viewed as a
“real”—albeit not necessarily physical—space. 51 In each internet-related
legal challenge, courts have decided which analogy is appropriate. 52 The
court can then confirm the rule it has settled upon by testing it in light
of the general principles and rationales that stand behind the analogy
(i.e., testing it “up”), and test it against other specific cases (i.e., testing it
“down”). 53 If over time the chosen analogy survives this process, it is
likely adequate for the problem as a whole. If not, a new review will be
conducted, and a new analogy will be chosen.
This journey is characterized by the value of analogical reasoning
as a flexible instrument which grows with the subject matter. It enables
the reviewer to take into account both the general values and principles
which stand as the basis of the new phenomenon, and at the same time,
its application to specific cases. This methodical search will help us in

See Jonathan H. Blavin & I. Glenn Cohen, Gore, Gibson, and Goldsmith: The
Evolution of Internet Metaphors in Law and Commentary, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 265
48

(2002) (exploring the evolution of metaphorical inferences as applied to the internet in
legal commentary and judicial opinion).
Id. at 269; see Clay Calvert, Regulating Cyberspace: Metaphor, Rhetoric, Reality, and
the Framing of Legal Options, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 541 (1998); see also
Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1064
(9th Cir. 1999) (comparing use of another’s trademark in one’s metatags to posting an
incorrect billboard along the highway); Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160,
173 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (analogizing the internet to a highway to support interstate
commerce argument). Courts later rejected the internet highway analogy. See Bihari v.
Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 319–21 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (questioning the appropriateness
of a highway metaphor as applied to metatags); Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (differentiating website links from
road signs).
Blavin & Cohen, supra note 48, at 275; see David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and
Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (1996) (arguing
courts should take cyberspace seriously as a unique place); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844, 851 (1997) (adopting the metaphor of cyberspace as a novel place existing outside
territorial boundaries).
Blavin & Cohen, supra note 48, at 283; LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 2.0 10-11 (2006);
Reno, 521 U.S. at 890 (O’Connor J., concurring).
See Sherwin, supra note 42, at 1182–83 (discussing courts’ use of analogy in the context
of property law).
Brewer, supra note 28, at 962. Brewer refers to this process as first “abducting” from
specific examples an “analogy warranting rule” and then testing it “up” against general
principles and “down” against current or future hypothetical examples. Id.
49

50

51

52

53
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establishing the adequate analogy in a manner that will guarantee we will
not be blinded by its charms or enslaved by its limitations.

B. The Case Against Legal Analogies
The use of legal analogies come with a price. As Cardozo’s
statement suggests, using analogies can be tendentious; it can narrow our
line of thought; it can inhibit the way we view new, and sometimes even
old, phenomena; and it can constrain our creativity when dealing with a
new and unfamiliar legal scenario. 54
Back in 1861, Maine identified the use of legal fictions as one of
three catalysts of legal change, the other two being equity and legislation.
He stated that legal fictions were a “relatively primitive way of changing
the law,” after which the main focus was shifted to the other two
catalysts. In the 1930s, Fuller carried out extensive research on legal
analogies, stating that “it seems exceedingly questionable whether it is
ever truly convenient to employ a fiction where the judge introducing
the reform can state the new rule in non-fictitious terms.” 56 The
widespread notion regarding legal fictions seemed to be that they should
only be treated as a training or supporting instrument, which is necessary
to establish the legal argument, but relevant only until a certain level of
self-assurance was achieved: “one could tolerate [legal fictions],
pragmatically, but only to a certain extent – the ideal was to do without
them.” 57
Bentham is one of the strongest opponents of the institution of
legal fictions. 58 He condemned even their mere use and considered their
implementation to be a deception used by lawyers. 59 His main objection
was institutional: he claimed the courts were essentially stealing power
from the legislator via the application of legal analogies. 60
Some scholars are skeptical of analogical reasoning as a substantive
form of reasoning, advocating instead for a more straightforward
analysis of a legal scenario with given values of stability and correct
55

5F

56F

See Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) (“Metaphors in law
are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by
enslaving it.”).
Maksymilian Del Mar, Recovering Legal Fictions: An Introduction, 9 INT’L J.L.
CONTEXT 437, 437 (2013); HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 25–27 (1861).
L. L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 513, 524 (1931).
See Del Mar, supra note 55, at 437.
C.K. OGDEN, BENTHAM’S THEORY OF FICTION 141 (1932) (“fiction of use to justice?
Exactly as swindling is to trade.”).
See generally Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, Bentham‘s Theory of Fictions, A “Curious
Double Language,” 11 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 223, 227 (1999).
FULLER, supra note 27, at 57; see also Sherwin, supra note 42, at 1183; Stolzenberg,
supra note 59, at 229 (noting that in later years, Bentham’s approach toward legal fictions
changed and was more positive in light of utilitarian purposes); L. L. Fuller, Bentham‘s
Theory of Fiction by C.K. Ogden, 47 HARV. L. REV. 367 (1933).
54
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decision-making. 61 They point to the “inferiority of analogical decisionmaking to ordinary legal reasoning.” 62 According to this approach,
analogical reasoning is inferior because it depends on prior legal
principles, and these prior decisions are surely morally questionable. 63
In her article, Crootof discusses the limitations inherent in the use
of analogy in the context of autonomous weapon systems, limitations
which also pertain to the use of analogy in the context of AI entities. 64
According to Crootof, legal analogies may be misleading because they
misrepresent important features which do not carry through to the
analogy itself. The precision of the comparison is inherently limited; if
it were not, there would be no need for analogies in the first place.
Furthermore, legal analogies may constrain our imagination in
approaching new legal situations in general, and new technological
devices in particular. New technologies are particularly problematic, as
they impede the proper regulation of these complex and unpredictable
entities, entities that have only become more mature and integrated
further into our society. The courts may fixate on a specific analogy that
will not be a good representative of the technology over time. 65 The
analogy limits our understanding of the subject at hand by highlighting
in a selective way a specific aspect of an issue over others which are then
marginalized. 66 Thus, they may be viewed as improperly result-focused,
like drawing a target circle around the arrow after it has already hit the
wall. 67

C. The Inevitability of Legal Analogies
While there is a solid argument against using legal analogies and
advocating for the adoption of legal standards instead, it is still not strong

See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 182–87
(1995); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 118–19 (1990).
Sherwin, supra note 42, at 1184; Alexander, supra note 39, at 80–86. Contra Hunter,
supra note 44, at 1241.
Sherwin, supra note 42, at 1184–85.
Rebecca Crootof, Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Limits of Analogy, 9 HARV.
NAT‘L SEC. J. 52, 79 (2018).
Kyle Graham presented two examples of this problem in an article: defamation law in
television and radio, and early airplane accidents. In both cases, courts tended to fixate
on an old analogy, not considering the way the technology matures and diffuses into the
market. These “simplistic early analogies do not always favor plaintiffs.” See Kyle
Graham, Of Frightened Horses and Autonomous Vehicles: Tort Law and its
Assimilation of Innovations, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1241, 1256 (2012).
Blavin & Cohen, supra note 48, at 267.
See Calo, supra note 31, at 223 (explaining that metaphors and analogies that courts
select for emerging technology can be outcome determinative). As evident here, it is
difficult to avoid the usage of analogies when one is trying to explain an idea.
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enough. For better or worse, legal analogies are inevitable. 68 Their
opponents have not presented a better alternative and it would be
counterintuitive to simply disregard them as part of the legal reasoning
process, 69 particularly when decisions need to be made about new
technologies. Legal analogies are an important part of our journey
towards establishing legal standards. These standards cannot dispense
with analogies entirely, but rather use them to their advantage for their
future development and implementation.
In the context of autonomous weapon systems, analogies present
different challenges from commercial everyday AI entities in scope,
degree, and frequency of potential damages (the mere usage of
autonomous weapon system entails unavoidable damage). For this
reason, the way we examine the applications of legal analogies of AI
entities can and should be different. The vast range of AI entities are
used in diverse and distinct scenarios, which means that determining
which analogy is appropriate depends on the circumstances and adapts
itself over time based on the changing salient features of the
technological devices via the reflective equilibrium process. 70
The problem of hacking autonomous weapons is an important
example. 71 The same considerations also apply to Internet of Things
(IoT) devices, which inherently possess the ability to be hacked from
near and afar, including the vast majority of AI entities connected to the
internet by design. 72 The fact that they are based on algorithms, and can
have their code rewritten, is an across-the-board problem which impacts
the reflective equilibrium process for choosing the best-suited analogy. 73
It emphasizes that electronic persons, children, and animals make for
poor analogies in the AI context, since AI entities lack genuine and
unaffected independence, as will be discussed in Part III. 74
This feature implies a lack of true autonomy and discretion for all
AI entities. They can be controlled by their users, those who
See DEDRE GENTER, THE STRUCTURE OF ANALOGICAL MODELS IN SCIENCE 1 (1980)
(quoting Johannes Kepler: “And I cherish more than anything else the Analogies, my
most trustworthy masters. They know all the secrets of Nature, and they ought to be
least neglected”).
Del Mar, supra note 55, at 441.
Crootof, supra note 64, at 56.
Id. at 80.
Lily H. Newman, An Elaborate Hack Shows How Much Damage IoT Bugs Can Do,
WIRED (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/elaborate-hack-shows-damage-iotbugs-can-do/ [https://perma.cc/6PCJ-TCUC].
Zak Doffman, FBI Issues ‘Drive-By’ Hacking Warning: This is How to Secure Your
Devices,
FORBES
(Dec.
6,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/12/06/dont-get-hacked-warns-fbi-this-ishow-you-connect-smart-devices/#1fb079db360a [https://perma.cc/2HNT-KTST].
See infra Part III; see also GABRIEL HALLEVY, LIABILITY FOR CRIMES INVOLVING
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS 28 (2015) (rejecting the animal analogy in the
context of criminal liability for AI).
68

69
70
71
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manufactured them, and even malicious third parties (i.e., hackers);
thus, rendering analogies attributing full independence and free will
unrestricted by others to these AI entities inappropriate. This, however,
does not undermine the agency analogy as will be discussed shortly.
The complete and utter rejection of legal analogies is futile.
Choosing this path will not benefit our legal toolkit. On the contrary, it
will minimize it in a way that may create an irreversible gap between the
legal realm and the non-legal realm. The mission of legal practitioners
should be to minimize the damage bad analogies cause. The only way
to accomplish this is by being aware of these disadvantages and
considering them while deciding the suitable legal analogy in each new
situation. 75
III. THE LEGAL ANALOGIES IN THE RUNNING
This section embarks on the reflective equilibrium voyage by
exploring the available AI legal analogies that are in contention. As was
established in the previous section, this voyage will help us to identify
the best-suited analogy for AI entities, which reconciles the general
principle behind the usage of the analogy and its applicability in specific
instances.
Many analogies have been suggested with regards to the place of
AI in our legal and social system. 76 First, property, which includes a
product (tool), a domestic pet, a wild animal or a slave; second,
“electronic persons”, including full-fledged adults and “quasi-persons”,
such as children and mentally damaged adults; third, the analogy this
Article advocates for – AI entities as agents; fourth, the aviation and
vaccination industries as an analogy to the AI industry as a whole. 77 Each
of these suggestions present different advantages, difficulties, and
consequences for choosing one analogy over the other. The use of any
analogy is directly linked to the applicability of different liability regimes
on AI entities and may be extremely useful in the context of AI damages
if done in a methodical and coherent manner. This section will
conclude with a quick remark about the notion that there is no adequate
BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 671 (13th ed. 1955) (quoting Samuel Butler:
“analogy points in this direction, and though analogy is often misleading, it is the least
misleading thing we have.”).
It is interesting to note that there is an entire, well-developed discipline of the reverse
image of using AI technology to enhance legal reasoning and better equip the courts to
adjudicate. See, e.g., Bruce G. Buchanan & Thomas E. Headrick, Some Speculation
about Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 23 STAN. L. REV. 40 (1970); ANNE
VON DER LIETH GARDNER, AN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE APPROACH TO LEGAL
REASONING (1987); E.C. Lashbrooke, Jr., Legal Reasoning and Artificial Intelligence,
34 LOY. L. REV. 287 (1988).
See Lehman-Wilzig, supra note 12, at 447–53 (detailing a quick review of these
analogies).
75

76
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analogy for AI entities; society should either treat AI entities the same
way it treats any other injurer or as something completely new.

A. AI as Property
Society can see AI entities as their creator’ or owners’ property
(chattels), analogized to products, animals (domesticated or wild), and
according to some suggestions, even slaves. 78 This approach will lead to
the application of product liability regulation, common law strict liability
rules with regards to wild and domesticated animals, and masters’ strict
liability for damages caused by their slaves, given the fact the latter has
no rights or duties of its own.

1. Products
Adopting the product analogy essentially acknowledges that AI
entities, or at least the majority of them, are nothing more than toasters
or fridges. 79 Much has been written about applying product liability to
damages created by AI entities and most articles have concluded that
given AI entities’ unique features, most prominent of which is the
“black-box” problem, product liability may not be enough to handle AIinflicted injuries. 80
Enrique Schaerer, et al., Robots as Animals: A Framework for Liability and
Responsibility in Human-Robot Interactions, THE 18TH IEEE INTERNATIONAL
78

SYMPOSIUM ON ROBOT AND HUMAN INTERACTIVE COMMUNICATION (2009); Peter M.
Asaro, A Body to Kick, but Still No Soul to Damn: Legal Perspectives on Robotics, in
ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS 169, 178
(2011).
Balkin, supra note 3, at 50; Ugo Pagallo, Killers, Fridges, and Slaves: A Legal Journey
in Robotics, 26 AI & SOC’Y 347, 347 (2011).
See, e.g., Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, The Coming Collision Between
Autonomous Vehicles and the Liability System, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1321, 1323
(2012) (discussing relevant liability doctrine and precedents from other technologies that
may indicate how judges and juries are likely to allocate liability for autonomous vehicle
crashes); F. Patrick Hubbard, “Sophisticated Robots”: Balancing Liability, Regulation,
and Innovation, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1820–29 (2014) (addressing ways the legal system
may respond to address physical injury from large, mobile, and sophisticated robots that
interact closely with humans); Sunghyo Kim, Crashed Software: Assessing Product
Liability for Software Defects in Automated Vehicles, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 300,
309–17 (2018) (reviewing the challenges in applying existing product liability theories to
accidents caused solely by software defects in fully automated vehicles); Bryant Walker
Smith, Automated Driving and Product Liability, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1 (2017)
(concluding that the current product liability regime, while imperfect, is probably
compatible with the adoption of automated driving systems); Karni A. ChagalFeferkorn, Am I an Algorithm or a Product? When Products Liability Should Apply to
Algorithmic Decision-Makers, 30 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 61, 90–102 (2019) (presenting
a classification system to identify the situations in which the application of product
liability principles is warranted given specific features of the AI-based algorithm);
Kenneth S. Abraham & Robert L. Rabin, Automated Vehicles and Manufacturer
Responsibility for Accidents: A New Legal Regime for a New Era, 105 VA. L. REV. 127,
79
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At the risk of immensely oversimplifying the science, AI is a
machine or an algorithm which reaches conclusions and makes
decisions without the intervention of humans. 81 Machine learning, a
branch of AI, uses the initial code and data base to teach itself the
“correct” or “best” decision. 82 As a result, the decision-making processes
itself takes place in a virtual “black-box” 83 and is unknown to the human
creator or user. 84 Neither the users nor the creators can fully understand
the process and justification that stand at the basis of an AI decisionmaking process. If the AI entity is self-taught, society cannot know for
certain who or what is responsible for its final decision, which may inflict
damage, injuries, or harm to humans or property.
For these reasons, AI decisions are seen as opaque, unpredictable,
and ultimately inexplicable. 85 The lack of foreseeability, AI entities’
varying degrees of autonomy, and the absence of complete human
control with regards to the potential behavior of AI entities leads to
difficulty in establishing a legal nexus of causation between the victim
and the tortfeasor as well as a difficulty in reasoning about causation in
fact between the damage inflicted and the liable party. 86 This in turn

139 (2019); Omri Rachum-Twaig, Whose Robot is it Anyway?: Liability of ArtificialIntelligence-Based Robots, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020); Bryan Casey,
Robot Ipsa Loquitur, 108 GEO. L. REV. 225, 271 (2019); Andrew D. Selbst, Negligence
and AI's Human Users, 100 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020); Tim Engelhardt, Who
Pays? On Artificial Agents, Human Rights and Tort Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY: GLOBAL POLITICS, LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 268, 277 (2019); Matthew U. Scherer, Of Wild Beasts and
Digital Analogues: The Legal Status of Autonomous Systems, 19 NEV. L.J. 259, 280
(2018).
Michael Copeland, What’s the Difference Between Artificial Intelligence, Machine
Learning
and
Deep
Learning?,
NVIDIA
(July
29,
2016),
blogs.nvidia.com/blog/2016/07/29/whats-difference-artificial-intelligence-machinelearning-deep-learning-ai/ [https://perma.cc/7W49-G4VY].
Id.; Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 679
(2017). Other branches include deep learning and neural network. See Q & A: The
future of artificial intelligence, people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~russell/temp/q-and-a.html
[https://perma.cc/729E-GML3].
Broadly, this term refers to “anything that has mysterious or unknown internal
functions or mechanisms.” Black-Box, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/black%20box [https://perma.cc/K4S8-ZK94].
Will Knight, The Dark Secret at the Heart of AI, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 11, 2017),
www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-the-heart-of-ai/
[https://perma.cc/7DJK-KUUJ].
Cliff Kuang, Can A.I. Be Taught to Explain Itself?, THE N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Nov.
21,
2017),
www.nytimes.com/2017/11/21/magazine/can-ai-be-taught-to-explainitself.html?smid=tw-share&_r=1 [https://perma.cc/XA99-62KR].
Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges,
Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 363 (2016); Jos Lehmann et
al., Causation in AI and the Law, 12 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 279 (2004).
81
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hampers the attribution of legal responsibility to a liable party, including
the manufacturer of the AI entity within the product analogy. 87
In order to successfully apply a product liability claim, the injured
party must prove that a product has at least one of three “defect”
categories—a manufacturing defect, design defect, or failure to provide
adequate instructions or warnings. 88 The first refers to a situation in
which the product “departs from its intended design even though all
possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the
product.” 89 With regards to AI entities, manufacturing defects are less
likely because today’s methods for manufacturing software are carried
out with low error rates. 90 More importantly, most damages caused by
AI entities cannot be traced back and proven to be the result of a specific
manufacturing problem, provided that they performed according to
their code and in accordance with the way they were manufactured and
designed, which leads us to the second defect. 91
A design defect will be examined according to the following
standard: “the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could
have been reduced by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design .
. . and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not
reasonably safe.” 92 It will be extremely difficult to prove a design defect
in an AI entity, given the black-box problem and the difficult question
of whether an alternative safer design would have been possible, or
whether the design defect would have been detected and replaced at the
design stage of the AI entity.
The third defect will apply when “the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the
provision of reasonable instructions or warnings . . . and the omission
of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably
Curtis E.A. Karnow, Liability for Distributed Artificial Intelligences, 11 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 147, 181 (1996).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (AM. LAW. INST. 1998).
Id. § 2(a).
See, e.g., AI Helps Manufacturers Identify Product Defects, NVIDIA (June 22, 2017),
https://news.developer.nvidia.com/ai-helps-manufacturers-identify-product-defects/
[https://perma.cc/DE44-HKBD] (explaining how AI takes pictures of an assembly line
and highlights units that appear defective or anomalous).
See John Villasenor, Products Liability Law as a Way to Address AI Harms,
BROOKINGS (Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/products-liability-lawas-a-way-to-address-ai-harms/ [https://perma.cc/VY7R-7LNY]; see also David C.
Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89
WASH. L. REV. 117, 125 (2014) (noting that courts may hesitate to assign liability to
automated systems where credible alternative theories of liability exist).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 2(b). This is called the
“risk-utility test.” See Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers’
Liability for Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 BROOK. L.
REV. 1061, 1063 (2003) (describing the ubiquity of the risk utility formula as the standard
by which to judge whether a product design is defective).
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safe.” 93 This duty refers to risks that are reasonably known at the time of
the sale of the product. Not all AI entities’ potential risks are foreseeable
in the time of the sale, 94 especially if the AI entity is an open product
which enables its users to modify it as they please. Furthermore,
complying with this duty can be achieved rather cheaply and easily by
attaching a long list of instructions and possible warnings to each AI
entity. 96
Equally important to the inherent difficulty in proving these three
defects when an AI entity is involved in an accident, is the fact that the
features of AI entities are, in most cases and on diverse levels, different
from those of simple products, which are the original focus of these
review standards.
Firstly, the social connections created with humans lead us to treat
AI entities differently than non-AI products. 97 To the humans who get
emotionally attached to them, they are no ordinary products. This
emotional connection, or at the very least a connection which is stronger
than the one humanity shares with its ordinary products, bears on the
appropriate AI analogy.
Secondly, AI entities’ black-box problem, the relative ease in
fulfilling the first and third product liability duties, 98 and the lack of ability
to explain why an alternative design would have been safer than the
current one, differentiates AI entities from other products. The
ambiguity surrounding AI entities’ capabilities and its unpredictable
actions and damages, all suggest that even though in its essence an AI
entity is a product that is being sold by a company to a consumer, it is
not similar enough to be treated as such.
In their traditional meaning, products are still pieces of hardware,
e.g., metal or plastic, which are rather mostly safe given their
95

95F

93

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c).

94

See, e.g., Tom Simonite, Google and Microsoft Warn that AI May Do Dumb Things,

WIRED (Feb. 11, 2019), www.wired.com/story/google-microsoft-warn-ai-may-do-dumbthings/?CNDID=47980536&CNDID=47980536&bxid=MjM5NjgxNTg3MDQ1S0&h
asha=ced742d2d3a4866b2ea54ba0ca0d8621&hashb=837f5fc791ec721e36b7507adc5
9c7f41260f260&mbid=nl_021119_daily_list1_p2&source=DAILY_NEWSLETTER
&utm_brand=wired&utm_mailing=WIRED%20NL%20021119%20(1)&utm_medium
=email&utm_source=nl [https://perma.cc/TNJ4-NQBB] (explaining the general
warning given by Google and Microsoft regarding their AI products).
Ryan Calo, Open Robotics, 70 MD. L. REV 571, 596–97 (2011).
Id. at 596.
Kate Darling, Extending Legal Protection to Social Robots: The Effects of
Anthropomorphism, Empathy, and Violent Behavior Towards Robotic Objects, in
ROBOT LAW 213–16 (Ryan Calo, A. Michael Froomkin & Ian Kerr eds., 2016).
Product liability requires some sort of causation which may be problematic to prove
in the AI context. See generally Bryant Walker Smith, Proximity-Driven Liability, 102
GEO. L.J. 1777, 1778–79 (2014) (arguing that growing proximity could significantly
expand sellers' point-of-sale and post-sale obligations toward people endangered by their
automated products).
95
96
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predictability. In contrast, AI entities are mostly software and may
behave in an erratic and unpredictable manner. 99 Given these features,
the product analogy should give way to an agent analogy, one which
accounts for the basic differences between a fridge and an algorithm,
and each of their social connections to humans.
Nonetheless, it should be noted that if an injured party can find
and establish one of the three aforementioned defects once an AI entity
inflicts damages, one should follow this claim to obtain remedy and may
choose to add another claim based on the AI entities as an AI agent
approach. 100

2. Animals – Domesticated and Wild
Comparing AI entities to animals is an appealing and intuitive
move, since this enables us to view the AI entity either as a domesticated
pet (e.g. canine ownership), 101 or as a wild animal (e.g. elephants or
tigers). The former choice suggests that the AI entity is (slightly more)
predictable than the latter. This is even more appealing, given the strong
feelings humans usually cultivate towards our AI companions, similar to
how humans care for, and even love, non-human animal companions. 102
With regards to wild animals, at common law, owners of animals
would be held strictly liable for damage caused by their undomesticated
animals if that harm is a cause of a “dangerous propensity characteristic
of animals of that class, and liability does not rest on experience with
particulate animals.” 103 The strict liability regime is justified because the
owner of the wild animal exposes others to abnormal risks in the form
of a wild bear or monkey due to the unpredictable nature of the
animal. 104

See Darling, supra note 97, at 216–17 (describing how robotic objects differ from other
inanimate objects).
See infra Part III, Section C; Part IV.
Richard Kelley et al., Liability in Robotics: An International Perspective on Robots as
Animals, 24 ADVANCED ROBOTICS 1861, 1862 (2010); see also Sophia H. Duffy &
Jamie Patrick Hopkins, Sit, Stay, Drive: The Future of Autonomous Car Liability, 16
SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 453, 467 (2013) (analogizing autonomous cars to domestic
dogs for liability purposes). This comparison does not necessarily extend to
domesticated cats. See Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience, Artificial Intelligence, Crisper
– and Dogs and Cats, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2303, 2308 (2018) (examining why
domesticated cats are immune from the same kinds of liability as domesticated dogs).
Darling, supra note 97, at 217–18.
SAMIR CHOPRA & LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY FOR AUTONOMOUS
ARTIFICIAL AGENTS 130 (2011).
See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537
(1972) (advocating for a strict liability regime). These could be viewed as nonreciprocal
risks, according to Fletcher’s approach. Id.
99
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The same is true with regards to domesticated animals, under the
scienter action at common law. 105 The owner of these animals will be
held strictly liable if she has knowledge of its “vicious propensity to cause
injury or damage to human beings,” even if no negligence can be
proven. 106 The owner will be found strictly liable if she must have known
or had reason to believe “of a dangerous propensity or trait that was not
characteristic of a similar animal.” 107
The resemblance between AI entities and animals is clear given
their erratic behavior and unpredictability as non-human entities who,
despite living side by side with us, cannot fully communicate with us. In
some cases, AI entities are even designed to look and behave like our
beloved animals, as in the case of Spotmini, Boston Dynamics Robot
Dog, and Paro the Baby Seal Robot. 108 If it is known that the AI entity is
as potentially dangerous as a wild animal and that harm is likely to occur
if it escapes the owner’s possession, the keeper, custodian and in most
cases, owner of the animal will be liable for damages it causes if it
escapes, regardless of negligence. 109 The same is true with regards to an
AI entity which, like most domesticated non-human animals is not
considered to be dangerous, but later becomes so. If the owner becomes
aware that it is dangerous, then she will have an additional obligation,
and will be held liable, if it is proved that her pet had an inclination to
produce unpredictable harm. Hence, these two analogies will most
likely lead to a strict liability regime when AI entities cause damages.
The differentiation between them, therefore, adds no clear value to the
legal analysis.
Moreover, there are two fundamental difficulties in using the
analogy of non-human animals in the AI context. First, even if there was
any value in distinguishing between these analogies, the classification of
AI entities as domesticated or wild animals is not necessarily obvious.
AI entities, such as autonomous weapons, which inherently possess a
higher ability to cause damages more than other AI entities, can be easily
classified as a wild animal rather than a domesticated one. However,
See Mulheron, Liability for Animals, in PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW 76, 77 (Cambridge
Univ. Press, 2016); see also Scherer, supra note 80, at 282 (describing the circumstances
under which a dog owner will be liable for harm caused by the dog).
See CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 103, at 130; see also Greely, supra note 101, at
2307 (“The ‘vicious propensity’ limitation follows from a general legal approach of
giving every dog ‘one free bite’ before its owner, who would then be on notice of the
dog's disposition, is liable for its bites.”).
CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 103, at 130.
David Z. Morris, Boston Dynamics is Gearing Up to Produce Thousands of Robots
Dogs, FORTUNE (July 21, 2018), fortune.com/2018/07/21/boston-dynamics-spotminirobot-dog/ [https://perma.cc/S86C-92V2]; see also PARO Therapeutic Robot, PARO,
www.parorobots.com/ [https://perma.cc/YX6J-52ZG] (giving an overview of the PARO
therapeutic robot).
Mulheron, supra note 105, at 76.
105
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even AI entities which have a more innocent purpose can still be highly
unpredictable and it will not be easy to decide which of the two
categories suits them better. A domesticated animal has gone through a
process of domestication or is known to be obedient from birth. These
indicators do not exist in the AI context, leading to the conclusion that
humans do not possess the ability to clearly distinguish a domesticated
AI entity from a wild one. All AI entities were programmed by a human
programmer, were trained and guided to fulfil a certain task, and thus
were domesticated in the technological sense of the word. 110 The level
of dangerous activity can be an indicator to the nature of the AI entity,
but the fact that AI entities are inexplicable and conduct their decisionmaking process in a black-box makes the classification of wild and
domesticated arbitrary. 111 Furthermore, looking for a “vicious
propensity” in an AI entity may be extremely problematic given the
forgoing arguments. 112
Second, unlike AI entities which were specifically created to fulfill
a human-designated purpose, animals, whether they are domesticated
or wild, were not. 113 They have a different purpose in life besides the
purpose they serve to us as humans. Their creation, i.e., birth, happened
without human interference. Their unpredictability stems from the fact
they are non-human animals with needs and desires separate from our
needs and desires of them. 114 This gap is not properly represented by
the animal analogy and will be better explained via the agency analogy.
It seems that the animal analogy is supported by different scholars
due to the strong connection humans tend to cultivate with AI entities,
but overlooks the many differences between them. For this reason, the
animal analogy is inappropriate when it comes to AI entities causing
harms. In its essence, the keeper or owner of the animal is the one
strictly liable with regard to the animal’s actions, while the latter is
judgment-proof. This relationship in the AI context can be reduced to
an agency triangle, which will better illustrate the legal connections
between the parties involved.

3. Slaves
Some scholars have called for treating AI entities as their owners’
slaves, 115 i.e., using an analogy to human beings who are essentially
110

Kelley, supra note 101, at 1864.

111

Id.

112

CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 103, at 130.
See Kelley, supra note 101, at 1868 (categorizing robots’ dangerousness based on the

113

human needs they were designed to meet).
See id. at 1864 (comparing the unpredictability of wild animals to the greater
predictability of robots).
Joanna J. Bryson, Robots Should be Slaves, 8 NAT. LANGUAGE PROCESSING 63
(2010).
114

115

2020]

AI ENTITIES AS AI AGENTS

1063

property. 116 Setting aside the problematic usage of this loaded word, 117
this analogy is based on the notion that AI entities are more intelligent
than a product and more human-like than animals, in some respects,
but still fall short of being free and autonomous humans, and are rather
someone’s property. 118
The appeal of using slavery as an analogy for AI entities is evident
from Katz’s work:
The parallels with autonomous agents are clear. The analogy
(like any other analogy) is not a perfect one, but comparison
may be instructive. Like a slave, an autonomous agent has no
right or duties itself. Like a slave, AI is capable of making
decisions which will affect the rights (and, in later law, the
liabilities) of its master. By facilitating commercial
transactions, autonomous agents can increase market
efficiency. Like a slave, an autonomous agent is capable of
doing harm. 119
To further advocate for this analogy, Pagallo presents the example
of “peculium” from Ancient Rome in the contractual context. 120 Given
the important role slaves had in Ancient Rome’s trade and commerce,
the peculium is a mechanism provided by Roman law which enables a
business to be run by slaves similar to a limited company, although the
business is still considered to be the property of the master. 121 Therefore,
Pagallo continues, society can apply this mechanism to modern
transactions mediated by AI entities. The attractiveness of using the
peculium mechanism stems from the fact that it shows “a sound way to
forestall any legislation that might prevent the use of robots due to their
risks and consequent excessive burden on the owners . . . of robots.” 122

Pagallo, supra note 79, at 351 (“[W]e may deem robots as autonomous agents that
are however merely ‘things.’”).
See, e.g., Joan M. Herbers, Watch Your Language! Racially Loaded Metaphors in
Scientific Research, 57 BIOSCIENCE 104, 104 (2007); Ron Eglash, Broken Metaphor:
The Master-Slave Analogy in Technical Literature, 48 TECH. & CULTURAL 360, 369
(2007) (“Surely, between our cultural resources and our desire for technical accuracy,
we can do better than ‘master’ and ‘slave’”). In the American context, slavery analogies
are considered taboo. This is not the case in European Civil law, which is entrenched
in Roman law, where slavery has a different historical, cultural and social context and
meaning. See generally W. W. BUCKLAND, THE ROMAN LAW OF SLAVERY: THE
CONDITION OF THE SLAVE IN PRIVATE LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN (1908);
ALAN WATSON, ROMAN SLAVE LAW (1987).
Pagallo, supra note 79, at 351.
Andrew Katz, Intelligent Agents and Internet Commerce in Ancient Rome, SOC’Y
FOR COMPUTERS & L. (Oct. 15, 2008), https://www.scl.org/articles/1095-intelligentagents-and-internet-commerce-in-ancient-rome [https://perma.cc/BE9U-4AX9].
Pagallo, supra note 79, at 351.
See BUCKLAND, supra note 117, at 131 (describing the nature of the peculium).
Pagallo, supra note 79, at 352.
116
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It essentially allows limited liability for the owner of robots and a
business warranty for those who have been injured by the AI entity. 123
Although the theoretical framework of the peculium is intriguing,
it fails to add value over that of legal agency, including instances of
corporate agency, which stand at the center of the peculium mechanism.
The AI entity is the representative of the company, its agent, and thus it
limits the liability of the slave itself and deflects the liability to the
principal (even if it is in times limited). The slavery analogy does not
contribute to the legal analysis over and above that of using the analogy
of agency.
In her article, Bryson unequivocally calls for the adoption of the
legal analogy of AI entities as slaves. 124 She claims that “robots should be
built, marketed and considered legally as slaves, not companion
peers.” 125 Furthermore, in her opinion, humans fully own robots and
determine their goals. 126 Her article presents four fundamental claims:
“1) Having servants is good and useful, provided no one is
dehumanized. 2) A robot can be a servant without being a person. 3) It
is right and natural for people to own robots. 4) It would be wrong to let
people think that their robots are persons.” 127
Delving into each of these claims exceeds the scope of this Article;
however, it is important to note that the analogy of a servant is not
identical to that of a slave, as Bryson seems to suggest. These four claims
do not necessarily lead to the notion that slaves are the most suitable
analogy, but rather that of servants which are agents of their principals,
even if the agent itself is not a person. Robots can be thought of as an
extension of us, similar to an agent, not a slave. 128 The fact that humans
dictate an AI entity’s motivation, design and decision-making system,
and that “all their goals are derived from us” does not necessarily lead
to the notion of slavery, unless humans wish to emphasize the property
aspect of AI entities at the expanse of their functionality. 129
Nonetheless, the property aspect makes no difference to the final
liability regime between the analogy of slaves and agents; whereas the
former entails personal, historical, and cultural reasons to object, 130 the
latter acknowledges the features Bryson identifies in her article without

Id. (stating there is no clear suggestion to a liability regime in the extra-contractual
aspect).
Bryson, supra note 115, at 63.

123
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125
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Id.
Id. (“The potential of robotics should be understood as the potential to extend our

own abilities and to address our own goals.”).
Id. at 65.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 73.
See generally supra discussion in note 117 (describing how this occurs mostly in the
American context).
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diminishing AI entities to nothing but property. 131 This Article rejected
this statement in its previous discussion about AI as products or animals,
given their unique characteristics, which attributes to AI entities
something more than being mere property in light of their ability to
evolve and improve over time. 132
The slave analogy tries to manifest both the property and the
function aspect of the AI entity, but ends up alienating itself in the eyes
of the public. Legal analogies are grounded on our common
understanding of a new phenomenon and are not meant only for the
law community, but for everyone who encounters that phenomenon.
Choosing an analogy that is rejected by the public given its historical
context, is not optimal especially if the same regulatory goal could be
achieved by utilizing agency law, a far less controversial path. Moreover,
there is merit in treating AI entities as something more than just
property. This allows for flexibility in light of fast advancements in AI
technology and implement those advances into the application of the
chosen analogy. The slavery analogy does not offer this benefit because
of its rigid property centralized context.
After reviewing the property side of the spectrum, this Article turns
to the opposing contender situated on the other side—treating AI entities
as electronic persons with independent rights and obligations.

B. AI as Electronic Persons
1. Quasi-Persons
AI entities could be considered as “quasi-persons” much like
children, and as some may even say, unborn human fetuses and severely
brain damaged and comatose individuals. 133 Children are not entitled to
the same rights of personhood as adults and they have limited legal
status, for example, children cannot sign contracts, drink, or vote. 134
Children receive more protections than adults in some cases, and their
responsibility for damages may be diminished given certain
circumstances. 135 This comparison seems to be based on the notion that
both children and AI entities are only able to control their actions up to
a certain degree. The rationale that stands at the basis of this analogy is
that if society is willing to diminish the responsibility of children based
on characteristics they allegedly share with AI entities, society should
Bryson, supra note 115, at 63.
See Darling, supra note 97, at 218–20 (describing humans’ emotional reactions and
attachments to robots with anthropomorphic qualities).
Asaro, supra note 78, at 179; Lehman-Wilzig, supra note 12, at 450.
Scherer, supra note 80, at 283.
See, e.g., GIDEON YAFFE, THE AGE OF CULPABILITY: CHILDREN AND THE NATURE
OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 66–96 (2018) (providing an example of damages in the
criminal context).
131
132

133
134
135
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extend the same courtesy and apply the same logic to AI entities, whose
actions cannot always be rationalized or justified.
When a child causes damages independently—with no help or
adult intervention—the focus shifts from strict liability to negligent
supervision by the child’s guardians. 136 This obligation acknowledges the
duty of care a parent has to prevent harm, even though there is no
general rule which creates an obligation to prevent damages caused by
a third party (i.e., the child). 137 The child analogy tries to create a
connection between the duty placed on parents “to take reasonable care
to control minor children or as to prevent them from intentionally
harming others or from creating an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to
them,” 138 to that of an owner, operator, designer, trainer or programmer
of an AI entity. 139 Similar to the case of domesticated animals, parents
are only obligated by this duty if it can be shown the minor has a
“propensity” to cause a specific type of damage and the parents were
aware of that propensity and failed to take action to prevent the
destructive behavior. 140
This analogy is fundamentally identical to that of domesticated
animals at common law. Many AI entities resemble toddlers and small
children in their external appearance and in their behavior and
interactions with those who surround them. 141 However, unlike pets,
treating AI entities as children attributes a new human aspect to them.
It suggests, that just like toddlers, AI entities will learn, develop, and
grow to become a part of adult society as fully capable and independent
entities. Society should sanction any mischief they might cause in a
pedagogical-rehabilitative way in order to ensure they will grow up to be
contributing members of society and that their guardians will make sure
that will come to pass. But that is not the case when it comes to AI
entities. The rationale standing behind punishing parents for negligent
supervision is not similar to that of sanctioning the parallel party in the
AI context. This also begs the question of who should be viewed as the
appropriate supervisor (i.e., parent or guardian) in the AI context. In
the child analogy, the answer is mostly clear but finding the parallel
Greely, supra note 101, at 2317.
CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 103, at 132.
Id. at 133; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
See Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt: Artificial Intelligence, Copyright,

136
137
138
139

and Accountability in the 3A Era – The Human-Like Authors are Already Here – A
New Model, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 659, 691 (2017) (discussing the multi-player model
in a copyright context).
CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 103, at 133–34. See also PAGALLO, supra note 3, at
125. The latter also elaborates on the Italian Civil Code and the civil law approach to
the field of extra-contractual obligations. Id. at 126–30.
See Rachel England, Adorable Home Robot Kuri Is Being Discontinued, ENGADGET
(July 25, 2018), https://www.engadget.com/2018/07/25/adorable-home-robot-kuri-isbeing-discontinued/ [https://perma.cc/NP89-XTTC] (showing a picture of “Kuri,”
which was intended to enter the home as a family member).
140

141
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entity in the AI realm is a difficult question, one that cannot be resolved
using the narrow analogy of AI-as-child.
Like animals, children were never meant to fulfill fully mature
humans’ commands and requests, even if they do resemble children in
their ability to learn from their mistakes to improve their future behavior
via a trial and error process (i.e., reinforcement learning). The gaps in
the means, purpose, and agenda are too great to be subsumed within a
single category. Again, in the AI context, using the analogy of agency
better represents the relationship of the relevant parties. The “AI child”
is a judgment-proof agent of its custodian. Therefore, the agency analogy
is better equipped to regulate AI accidents than that of AI-as-child.

2. AI Personhood
The most liberal analogy for AI entities is that of “electronic
persons” with rights and obligations (i.e., treating AI entities as equals to
human adults). 142 This approach openly embraces the homunculus idea,
according to which the AI entity is a legal being, separate from its
creators owners, or dispatchers, and is by itself responsible for its
behavior, actions, and consequences. 143
The category of “electronic persons” grants an AI entity
personhood as a member of society. 144 This personhood may include
obtaining citizenship (as in the case of the robot Sophia, which received
Saudi Arabia citizenship in October 2017), paying taxes, exercising First
Amendment rights, exercising intellectual property rights, and the ability
to express consent. 145

Leon E. Wein, The Responsibility of Intelligent Artifacts: Toward an Automation
Jurisprudence, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 103, 140 (1992).
Balkin, supra note 3, at 58–59.
See Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs with Recommendations to the
Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, at 18 (Jan. 1, 2017),
142

143
144

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2017-0005_EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EE2N-YCBE ] [hereinafter EU Report].
See Kristen Korosec, Saudi Arabia’s Newest Citizen is a Robot, FORTUNE (Oct. 26,
2017),
fortune.com/2017/10/26/robot-citizen-sophia-saudi-arabia/
[https://perma.cc/4DH5-HLB7]; Robert David Hart, Saudi Arabia’s Robot Citizen is
Eroding Human Rights, QUARTZ (Feb. 14, 2018), qz.com/1205017/saudi-arabiasrobot-citizen-is-eroding-human-rights/ [https://perma.cc/D2SU-SG4G] (giving a critical
aspect of granting citizenship to robots); Ryan Abbott & Bret N. Bogenschneider,
Should Robots Pay Taxes? Tax Policy in the Age of Automation, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 145, 168 (2018) (describing tax policy options for an automation tax); Ignatius
Michael Ingles, Regulating Religious Robots: Free Exercise and RFRA in the Time of
Superintelligent Artificial Intelligence, 105 GEO. L. REV. 507, 519–20 (2017) (outlining
arguments for and against giving robots free exercise of religion protection); Russ
Pearlman, Recognizing Artificial Intelligence (AI) as Authors and Inventors Under U.S.
Intellectual Property Law, 24 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3–4 (2018) (advocating for
intellectual property rights for AI); Lily Frank & Sven Nyholm, Robot Sex and Consent:
145
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In a liability context, this legal analogy may lead to sanctioning the
AI entity itself. This result seems to resemble a piece of science fiction
that is impractical and lacking legal justification, and which stands at the
heart of the ex-post and ex-ante systems (e.g., deterrence and fairness). 146
Nonetheless, this approach has gained much traction in light of the EU
Parliament report published in 2016, which suggested treating AI
entities like electronic persons as a possible future solution to AI
liability. 147 Many read into this suggestion the possibility of granting
robots their own “personhood” as separate legal beings with obligations
and, as a result, perhaps even deserving rights. 148 This led to scholarly
turmoil and protest. More than 150 experts in robotics, artificial
intelligence, law, medical science, and ethics warned against Europe
granting robots rights. 149 In an open letter to the European Commission,
these experts claimed the proposal appears to be influenced more by
science fiction than real world experience. 150
However, it is important to note that the EU report does not
display favoritism towards one solution over another; it merely tries to
provide a general futuristic picture of what instruments of legislation the
EU can consider in attempting to regulate robots in a liability context. 151
Furthermore, the report states nothing about granting AI rights but
rather only talks about their obligations. 152 The problem with this
argument, like that presented in the context of animals, is that the
existence of obligations usually leads to the parallel existence of rights. 153
Is Consent to Sex between a Robot and a Human Conceivable, Possible, and
Desirable?, 25 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 305 (2017).
See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS – A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
146

ANALYSIS 35–95 (1970) (explaining the goals and sub-goals of the tort system);
HALLEVY, supra note 74, at 185–229 (explaining the sanctioning of AI entities in the
criminal context).
See EU Report, supra note 144, at 18 (“Creating a specific legal status for robots in
the long run, so that at least the most sophisticated autonomous robots could be
established as having the status of electronic persons responsible for making good any
damage they may cause, and possibly applying electronic personality to cases where
robots make autonomous decisions or otherwise interact with third parties
independently.”).
147

148

Id.

Ivana Kottasová, Experts Warn Europe: Don’t Grant Robots Rights, CNN (Apr. 12,
2018),
money.cnn.com/2018/04/12/technology/robots-rights-experts-warneurope/index.html [https://perma.cc/NVS7-PVM8]; Janosch Delcker, Europe Divided
over Robots ‘Personhood’, POLITICO (Apr. 11, 2018), www.politico.eu/article/europedivided-over-robot-ai-artificial-intelligence-personhood/
[https://perma.cc/TL5H3DQ7].
ROBOTICS–OPEN LETTER, www.robotics-openletter.eu/ [https://perma.cc/5CEGUDNE].
See EU Report, supra note 144, at 17.
Id. at 36.
In the animal context, some argue for granting non-human animals rights, but if we
can sue humans for abusing or killing animals, then theoretically the opposite is also
149
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It is hard to impose obligations on the one hand without granting rights
on the other. This may lead to a slippery slope where imposing
obligations on AI entities will inevitably lead to also assigning them
rights. 154 For example, if an AI entity is found liable for the damage it
causes, it seems only reasonable that a human can be found liable if she
causes damages to the AI entity itself. 155 In the AI context, society is
trying to protect humans from potential damages they may be exposed
to by AI entities, and in the process, society may unintentionally reward
the latter rights that it did not want them to have.
In April 2018, the EU Commission published an outline of an
artificial intelligence strategy which does not mention the European
Parliament call to grant personhood for AI. 156 This does not necessarily
entail the complete rejection of the notion, but rather the rejection of its
immediate adoption, as can be expected given the current technological
status of AI entities, and the gap between their capabilities and human
capabilities. 157
On the other hand, some scholars argue that awarding AI entities
with personhood will be unavoidable in the future due to the fast
advancement of AI technology. 158 Chopra and White argue that “the
conditions for each kind of legal personality could, in principle, be met
by artificial intelligence agents in the right circumstances. We suggest
that objections to such a status for them are based on a combination of
human chauvinism and a misunderstanding of the notion of a legal
person.” 159 Chopra and White suggest this is a pragmatic question rather
true; we could sue a non-human animal attacker that has injured a human. Without
knowing what rights we owe animals, it is difficult to know what rights we would owe
robots. Nathan Heller, If Animals Have Rights, Should Robots?, THE NEW YORKER
(Nov. 28, 2016), www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/11/28/if-animals-have-rightsshould-robots [https://perma.cc/68HR-YSR2].

See id.
See Todd Leopold, HitchBot, the Hitchhiking Robot, Gets Beheaded in
Philadelphia, CNN (Aug. 4, 2015), www.cnn.com/2015/08/03/us/hitchbot-robot154
155

beheaded-philadelphia-feat/index.html [https://perma.cc/P4X4-CEDP] (discussing a
case involving human vandalism of a robot).
European Commission Press Release IP/18/3362, Artificial Intelligence: Commission
Outlines a European Approach to Boost Investment and Set Ethical Guidelines (Apr.
25, 2018), europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3362_en.htm [https://perma.cc/3LGCME8F].
Thomas Burri, The EU is Right to Refuse Legal Personality for Artificial Intelligence,
EURACTIV (May 31, 2018), www.euractiv.com/section/digital/opinion/the-eu-is-rightto-refuse-legal-personality-for-artificial-intelligence/
[https://perma.cc/XH9S-VLRB]
(stating the refusal to immediately adopt the idea is correct because: (1) the EU cannot
establish what “personhood” means (it is up to the individual member states); and (2)
giving personhood to AI would lead to unintended consequences).
Amanda Wurah, We Hold These Truths to Be Self-Evident, that All Robots are
Created Equal, 22 J. FUTURES STUD. 61, 64 (2017); CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 103,
at 191.
CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 103, at 27.
156
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than a logical one: “considering artificial agents as legal persons is, by
and large, a matter of decision rather than discovery, for the best
argument for denying or granting artificial agents’ legal personality will
be pragmatic rather than conceptual.” 160 They claim that the law might
require the future recognition of AI as legal persons in light of their
functionality and social role. Despite this, they still reject the notion of
AI personhood due to a pragmatic approach, but state they do not
object to robot’s personhood in the future when the conditions are
ripe. 161 Chopra and White conclude by asserting that the only cause that
may deprive the acknowledgment of robots as legal persons is “a
chauvinistic preservation of a special statues for biological creatures’
uniqueness and the singularity of the human mind and moral sense in a
naturalistic world order.” 162 In essence, they claim that if society will not
grant rights to robots in the future, it will be due to our condescending
nature and the belief that the human race is superior to all other species.
Pagallo also discusses this topic by presenting Solum’s approach
from 1992 and his attempt to refute the three main arguments against
granting AI legal personhood: first, AI entities are not humans; second,
the “missing-something” argument; third, AI entities ought to be
property. 163 Pagallo presents the arguments made by “the front of robotic
liberation.” 164 First, legal personhood “might prevent the ethical
aberration of robots being treated as mere slaves.” 165 Second, granting
legal personhood to robots “would provide a more coherent picture of
today’s legal framework.” 166 Pagallo eventually rejects the notion of legal
personhood for robots: “for the foreseeable future, it is thus likely that
the independent personhood of robots will not be on the legal
agenda.” 167 Following a logic similar to that of Chopra and White,
abovementioned, he determines that treating robots as legal persons in
the fields of immunity, strict liability, and unjust damages raises the
discussion to a level of science fiction and is therefore inadequate to be
applied on AI entities in today’s legal environment. 168
Treating AI entities as persons and granting them AI personhood
would be getting ahead of ourselves in light of today’s technological
advancements. This does not mean it will be irrelevant in the future, but
rather that, as of now, treating AI entities as humans will be grossly
Id. at 154.
Id. at 159. “Only the first kind [dependent legal personality] is likely to be accorded
to artificial agents unless or until they attain a very high degree of autonomy.” Id.
Id. at 191.
PAGALLO, supra note 3, at 158–60 (citing Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for
Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1258–76 (1992)).
Id. at 155.
Id. at 158–60.
Id.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 164–65.
160
161
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misguided given their dependency on an owner, operator, designer,
trainer, or programmer in the process of their decision making. There
might be a future where AI entities can and should be treated as equals
to humans, but that future is still far off. 169 Trying to impose it given
today’s state of technological progress would be inaccurate and
premature. 170

C. AI as Agents – Agency Law and Corporations
This Article advocates employing an analogy that treats AI entities
as agents, as if they were “servants” of their owners, operators, designers,
trainers, or programmers. 171 The agency analogy refers to AI entities as
agents which are monitored, guided, and receive directions and tasks
from a human principal who has control over the purposes the AI entity
has to accomplish.
This analogy includes corporations, which are considered separate
legal beings and can be sanctioned even though they are not human.
Agency law essentially allows corporations to act. 172 The corporation
functions as a legal entity for all intents and purposes; it can sign
contracts, sue and be sued, and buy property, among other things. 173 The
corporation acts via its board of directors (the agents), who were
authorized by the company itself via its shareholders (the principals). 174
The company will be held liable if its agents cause damages. 175 In case
the company is insolvent (as is the case for AI entities, which are always
insolvent), a sanction will be imposed on the company shareholders
behind its corporate veil, not on the company itself or the agents. 176 This
is a good example of the way in which agency relationship could be
constructed even though one of the parties is not a human entity. In
See Scherer, supra note 80, at 262–63 (noting a similar conclusion to that of Pagallo).
See generally Mark Coeckelbergh, Robot Rights? Towards a Social-Relation
Justification of Moral Consideration, 12 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 209 (2010); F. Patrick
Hubbard, “Do Androids Dream?”: Personhood and Intelligent Artifacts, 83 TEMP. L.
REV. 405 (2011); Phil McNally & Sohail Inayatullah, The Rights of Robots: Technology,
Culture, and Law in the 21st Century, 20 FUTURES 119 (1988); Herman T. Tavani, Can
Social Robots Qualify for Moral Consideration? Reframing the Question about Robot
Rights, 9 INFO. 73 (2018); David J. Gunkel, The Other Question: Can and Should
Robots Have Rights?, 20 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 87 (2018); Robert van den Hoven van
Genderen, Do We Need New Legal Personhood in the Age of Robots and AI?, in
169
170

ROBOTICS, AI AND THE FUTURE OF LAW 15 (Marcelo Corrales et al. eds., 2018).
Lehman-Wilzig, supra note 12, at 451. But see Rachum-Twaig, supra note 80 (stating
new laws should be considered to address liability related to AI).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
171

172
173
174

Id.
Id.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
See David K. Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the
Limits of the Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1307 (2007).
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both cases—corporate principals and AI agents—the human which
stands behind the scenes is the true puppeteer. 177
Agency law and the legal doctrine of vicarious liability (respondeat
superior) go hand-in-hand in the tort context when damages occur. 178 A
legal three-party relationship is formed when an agent—in our case an
AI entity—carries out an order from its superior which inflicts damage
on a third party or a third party’s property. 179
It is important to note that the Restatement (Third) of Agency Law
states in its terminology clause that computer programs cannot be
considered as agents.
[A] computer program is not capable of acting as a principal or an
agent as defined by the common law. At present, computer programs
are instrumentalities of the persons who use them. If a program
malfunctions, even in ways unanticipated by its designer or user, the
legal consequences for the person who uses it are no different than the
consequences stemming from the malfunction of any other type of
instrumentality. That a program may malfunction does not create
capacity to act as a principal or an agent. 180
One conclusion that can be derived from this comment is that
current legislation binds software to be nothing more than an instrument
in a way that its degree of “intelligence” is not relevant. 181 However, the
wording of this comment articulates the notion that stands behind our
justification to treat AI entities as agents—it is indeed an instrument in
the hands of its human controller, but it is not only that. 182 If society
accepts this comment at face value, the discussion surrounding AI’s
inflicting damages is superfluous, because computer software should
also be treated as a product. This is not necessarily true. The comment
written in 2006 states that “at present” computer programs are nothing
more than an instrument, but AI advancements may disprove this
assumption in light of new factual and technological advancements,
which create a new “at present” assumption of today’s technology and
that of the years to come. 183
PAUL L. DAVIS, GOWER’S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 201–33 (6th ed.,
1997). See also MARC MOORE & MARTIN PETRIN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: LAW,
REGULATION AND THEORY 35–37, 230–34, 268–70 (2017) (discussing the “agency
costs” in corporations); Scherer, supra note 80, at 264 (discussing AI personhood
through a corporation analogy).
See discussion infra Part IV, Section B.4.
DAVIS, supra note 177, at 176. See also P. S. ATIYAH, VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN THE
LAW OF TORTS (1967); CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 103, at 128 (providing additional
discussion regarding respondeat superior).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
Shawn Bayern, Artificial Intelligence and Private Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 144, 150 (Woodrow Barfield & Ugo Pagallo
eds., 2018).
Scherer, supra note 80, at 262 (noting AI can also do things without human control).
Id. at 262–63.
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The comment states:
[i]f a program malfunctions, even in ways unanticipated by its
designer or user, the legal consequences for the person who
uses it are no different than the consequences stemming from
the malfunction of any other type of instrumentality. 184
If society agrees to this presumption, then there is nothing
particularly special or novel about the way the law should treat AI.
Nonetheless, other factors suggest otherwise and have demonstrated
that this is not the case. Among them are the vigorous academic and
technological discussions surrounding AI, AI’s unique features and
roles in various industries, and AI’s ability to reach decisions in a
different way than popular computer software from more than a decade
ago. 185 If the agency analogy is accepted, this legislation should be
amended accordingly and not prevent the treatment of AI entities as AI
agents. 186
When it comes to autonomous technology in general, and AIspecific applications, Chopra and White make a strong case for
autonomous artificial agents. 187 Calo also alludes to robots as agents
when he presents the example of using the robot metaphor to describe
an entity as an extension of a person. 188 Treating such an entity as
someone’s robot essentially views it as an agent—the long hand of the
principal. This analogy is also appropriate even if the robots are not
programmable machines and possess some degree of independent
“will,” and in so doing, they resemble people more than some may think
or want to believe.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
Scherer, supra note 80, at 263. See also Salil K. Mehra, Antitrust and the Robo-Seller:
Competition in the Time of Algorithms, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1323, 1366–67 (2016)
(discussing this comment in an antitrust context); David Marc Rothenberg, Can Siri 10.0
184
185

Buy Your Home: The Legal and Policy Based Implications of Artificial Intelligent
Robots Owning Real Property, 11 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 439, 449–51 (2016)
(arguing that in practice, robots are already acting as agents despite the wording of the
Restatement).
Scherer, supra note 80, at 286 (“[T]he fact that A.I. systems are not legal ‘persons’
would present no barrier to treating them as agents of the persons or entities who created
or deployed them.”).
CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 103, at 154. See also PAGALLO, supra note 3, at 166.
Chopra and White advocate for agency, stating the hardest problem in assigning liability
to artificial agents is determining which case law to use. CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note
103, at 119. They compare liability for artificial agents to that of animals, children,
prisoners (or slaves), and extremely hazardous activities. Id. at 120. See also Pagallo,
supra note 79, at 353; Scherer, supra note 80, at 290 (stating treating AI entities as agents
“strike a balance
between ensuring that victims receive compensation and protecting designers and sellers
of A.I. systems from liability for harm that results from transformations (as opposed to
mere implementations) of their technologies.”).
Calo, supra note 31, at 221.
186

187
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AI entities present challenges in the form of enhanced capabilities
and unpredictability, thus outgrowing the analogy of being mindless.
Calo offers some insight to the way the robot itself is used as a legal
metaphor by courts and officials, 189 usually utilizing features attributed to
robots and robot-like behavior to human beings when they want to
describe the “shorthand of a person without will,” which is completely
controlled by another. 190 This notion of robotic behavior has become
inaccurate as AI entities’ abilities have increased over recent years. 191
The back and forth reasoning between the cases adjudicated in court
and the general principles we hold with regards to AI entities has shifted
with the advancement of AI technology from the analogy of mere
products to something more, without fully understanding what exactly
that addition is and how it can be manifested.
The AI-as-agent scheme seems preferable compared to other
suggested legal analogies, in part because the latter eventually converge
on the agency model. 192 Furthermore, it offers greater adaptability and
Id. at 216 (stating judges may “invoke emerging technology rhetorically in order to
motivate or justify decisions about people”).
Id. at 223.
Id. at 224.
See supra Part III (covering these analogies and their convergence); see also Ignacio
N. Cofone, Servers and Waiters: What Matters in the Law of A.I., 21 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 167 (2018) (discussing a new way to treat AI entities by using legal analogies based
on three AI traits derived from Calo and Balkin: embodiment, social valence, and
emergence). See also Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L.
REV. 513, 545 (2015); Balkin, supra note 3, at 57. Emergence is divided into two
aspects—unpredictability and agency. Cofone, supra note 192, at 183. The first aspect
focuses on the human perspective and examines humans’ ability to foresee (direct
liability) or control (vicarious liability) AI entities to determine humans’ liability when
an AI entity inflicts damages. The second aspect uses the term “agency” to refer to the
internal perspective of the robot itself to determine the extent to which AI entities “could
respond to legal incentives directly.” Id. at 185. In other words, this perspective asks
whether (and to what extent) an AI entity operates autonomously and independently.
Conversely, this Article’s discussion of agency refers to the relationship between a
principal and an agent. In the context of Cofone’s article, “agency” is used to talk about
the autonomous ingredient an AI entity will possess in the future, because “AI agents
with agency are so far inexistent.” Id. Cofone’s proposed framework would select the
appropriate analogy for every AI accident case. Id. at 174. The analogies Cofone
suggests represent a continuum—from an adult human, to a child, to a domesticated
animal, to a wild animal, and finally, to a corporation or a tool. Id.
However, the spectrum between adult humans—for which there is not currently a robotic
equal—and tools and products could be represented by an agent-principal relationship
for two reasons. First, the levels of embodiment, emergence, and social valance (very
high, high, low, and very low, respectively) can be manipulated to achieve a predetermined analogy. Deciding the degree of a feature in an AI entity may be complicated
and experts from differing fields (e.g., science and law) may interpret each feature-level
in a different way relative to the same AI entity and circumstances. Id. at 176. Second,
until agency as described by Cofone materializes, analogizing AI entities to adult
humans—or even children—is premature. Id. at 196.
189

190
191
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flexibility relative to the other contenders. 193 One of its major features is
its ability to act according to circumstances and function in a contextspecific way. 194 The more unpredictable an AI entity becomes, the more
it is akin to a human agent, but it does not amount to a fully-fledged
human. 195 AI entities are proactive, have a varying degree of social ability
to interact with humans, and are independent from humans to a certain
extent, that is, there is a low level of human intervention in its decisionmaking process. 196 Therefore, the analogy to a judgment-proof agent
provides a model that fundamentally presents the legal relationships of
the other available analogies in an accurate way. It also offers a wide
range of functions and context-based scenarios that are unparalleled to
other instances of legal analogies, such as pets and children. 197
Human agents exist in our world in many frameworks, as drivers,
delivery men and women, employees, trustees, and more. 198 This
existing body of agents can be extremely helpful when we shift our focus
to AI entities carrying out activities that may cause damages.
Furthermore, many AI entities are created to eliminate the need for
human agents as an AI machine is offered to complete the job instead. 199
This also strengthens the appropriateness of using the analogy of agents
in this relationship context between AI entities and humans.

Cofone, supra note 192, at 174.
Id. at 174–75.
Id. at 195–96.
See generally Kate Darling, Extending Legal Protections to Social Robots: The Effects
of Anthropomorphism, Empathy, and Violent Behavior Towards Robotic Objects,

193
194
195
196

ROBOT LAW 213–31 (2014) (discussing the issue of robots that are designed to interact
with humans on a social level).
See Cofone, supra note 192, 175–76. Scholars attempt to establish an analogy between
the owners of AI entities, such as autonomous vehicles, and owners of animals, such as
dogs. Duffy & Hopkins, supra note 101, at 467. However, these attempts neglect many
details. The mere fact that AI entities think and act independently from their human
owners (to a variable degree) is a feature they share with animals. However, this common
trait may not be enough to persuade us that dogs and AI machines are each other’s
peers. AI entities and dogs serve no common function, and the practical implications of
their “usage” and “being” is very different. For example, AI entities are manufactured,
while dogs are born like any other mammal. This difference is significant in the context
of torts when determining who is responsible for AI-inflicted damages. In this scenario,
the dog analogy falls short. A more suitable solution is necessary to reconcile our general
principles with specific cases. See supra Part III, Section A.2.
These frameworks mainly represent principal-agent relationships.
Kenneth Coats, Let the Robots Take Over: How the Future of AI Will Create More
Jobs,
FORBES
TECH.
COUNCIL
(Dec.
28,
2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/12/28/let-the-robots-take-overhow-the-future-of-ai-will-create-more-jobs/#59808af23c6d [https://perma.cc/MM8X5MXQ] (describing the use of robots in transportation, health care, home services,
education, public safety, employment, and entertainment, among other areas of the
economy).
197
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As of now, in light of the social relationships cultivated with our AI
companions, 200 the programmed goal assigned to them to complete on
our behalf, and their proliferation among us, AI entities cannot be
considered as adult humans yet, nor are they children or pets.
Agency offers us a way to utilize the many benefits of legal
reasoning through analogies without, as cautioned by Judge Cardozo
above, enslaving our thoughts. 201 On the contrary, it enables courts,
officials, and lay people to draw parallels between new and old scenarios
with a healthy dose of flexibility, which will prevent us from falling into
the traps set up by legal analogies. 202 Moreover, the continuous back and
forth reasoning process that stands at the heart of identifying and
implementing the appropriate analogy also shields us from falling into
these traps and enables us to verify that our general and specific
principles will always reside in harmony. 203
Treating AI entities as AI agents emphasizes the rejection of the
homunculus idea evident in our previous discussion about electronic
persons—that is, the notion that the AI entity has its own intentions,
desires, and thoughts. 204 Those who created, owned, or dispatched the
AI entity are responsible for its behavior, acts, and inflicted damages. 205
The AI entity is the agent of its creator, owner, or dispatcher and is not
liable by itself. 206 In most AI-inflicted damages cases, this is the most
adequate and best-suited analogy through which we can identify the
liable party.

D. Analogies of the AI Industry
This sub-chapter explores a different set of analogies to the AI
market as a whole. These analogies try to push for the opposite of a
strict liability regime, which was embedded in the analogies presented
thus far, in the form of a no-liability regime. The main underlaying
justification for this liability regime rests on the stifling of AI innovation.
Reviewing these analogies will present how they are inadequate to
address our subject matter and how they direct us to the appropriate
path of strict liability via agency, rather than a no-liability regime. These
analogies try to establish a connection between the AI industry and (1)
Calo, supra note 192, at 532 (stating robots today have “social valance,” in that they
feel more like living beings); Balkin, supra note 3, at 46 (stating people may substitute
AI agents and robots for other living things, including humans, in certain contexts).
Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94 (1926).
Cofone, supra note 192, at 174–77.

200

201
202
203

Id.

Balkin, supra note 17, at 1223 (referring to the “homunculus fallacy” – the idea there
is a person inside the machine who has good or bad intentions and makes the machine
do good or bad actions).
Balkin, supra note 3, at 52.
204
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the aviation industry system of time limits and predictable pay-outs; and
(2) the vaccine system and regulation, which includes a mass
compensation fund in case damages happen. 207

1. The Aviation Industry
It seems logical prima facie to compare an AI entity and an
airplane flying on autopilot mode while a pilot still sits at the pilot’s
chair. 208 In Brouse v. United States, which was decided in 1949, the Ohio
District Court placed liability on a pilot, who was using autopilot mode,
for a crash that happened between two airplanes. 209 The court stated
people in charge of airplanes under robotic control must keep a “proper
and constant lookout,” particularly where the airplane is in flight across
recognized and established airways. 210 However, this case is inadequate
when it is applied to the AI market in three ways.
First, there is no assurance that there will even be a human driver
or operator in future autonomous car models and other AI entities.
Therefore, placing liability on the operator will become irrelevant if she
has no role in the actual operation of the AI-based machine. 211 Second,
the person who was liable for the accident was an army airplane pilot
flying a plane owned by the government. 212 This may have contributed
to the conclusion the pilot was liable because the government has deep
pockets and could pay for the damage. 213 The same policy logic will
usually not apply in the commercial AI context where governmental
bodies are rarely a crucial part of the manufacturing and marketing
ecosystems. 214
Third, there is an immense difference in operating an airplane in
the sky and operating any other “robotic control” device on the ground
or at sea. The airplane industry was built upon the usage of autopilots,
and it is a well-accepted custom to use them in our aerial space. 215 This
space is much more rigorously regulated than any other physical space,
especially since this case was adjudicated back in 1949. For example,
the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 granted immunity to
manufactures of small planes and their parts from liability for eighteen
Sheela Jayabala et al., Artificial Intelligence Governance: A Heads up from Driverless
Cars, 34 WORLD APPL. SCI. J. 376, 379 (2016).
Marchant & Lindor, supra note 80, at 1325.
207

208
209

Brouse v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 373 (N.D. Ohio 1949).

210

Id. at 374–75.
Id.
Id. at 374.

211
212

Marchant & Lindor, supra note 80, at 1329 (noting the party with the “deep[est]
pockets” is likely to be found liable in a crash involving an autonomous vehicle).
The exception to this statement may be autonomous weapons machines.
See, e.g., Allison Hope, How Autopilot on Planes Works, CONDE NAST TRAVELER
(Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.cntraveler.com/story/how-autopilot-on-planes-works
[https://perma.cc/U6VG-Y9EF] (describing the history and use of autopilot).
213
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years in order to make sure the industry will survive notwithstanding
liability suits. 216 The net social benefit of having an airline industry
motivated Congress to act for its protection. 217 Whether we can expect
Congress to do the same in the AI context is highly doubtful due to the
vast implications AI entities have in various fields, unlike airplanes
which are restricted to the field of aviation alone. It will be difficult to
grant complete immunity to specific manufactures, as will become clear
in our discussion about the vaccination industry below.
Time limits and predictable pay-outs are an important tool at the
hands of the aerial industry; however, they are less apt in the AI context.
Assuming AI entities are like autonomous vehicles, time limits are
inapplicable to AI entities because the notion of applying an identical
rigorous time limitations scheme to the usage of autonomous vehicles
on the ground or autonomous vessels at sea is unliberal and impractical.
The demands for certifications are vastly diverse and less rigorous when
we depart the aerial space, and the physical infrastructures required for
an efficient participation of a vast number of vehicles on the ground are
extremely different than that required for airplanes in the air. 218 The payout approach may be applicable to autonomous entities on the ground
in the form of strict liability with a built-in roof limitation. 219
These elements lead us away from placing liability on the pilot of
a plane flown by autopilot, as was decided in Brouse. Unless the
operator of the AI entity has committed an act that completely deflects
the damage endured from the AI entity itself to her behavior, it will be
difficult to claim she should be held liable over the manufacturer of the
AI device. We can see a contemporary example for this notion in the
Uber autonomous vehicle accident which lead to the death of
Elena Herzberg, a pedestrian in Tempe, Arizona, in March 2018 while
a human driver was sitting in the driver’s seat. 220 The investigation of the
accident discovered the car recognized the pedestrian prior to the
collision but did not take any active measures to stop the car or alert the

216

General Aviation Revitalization Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2019).

See Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, The General Aviation Revitalization Act: How
Rational Civil Justice Reform Revitalized an Industry, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 1269, 1341
217

(2002) (stating there was social policy that supported the General Aviation Revitalization
Act).
In other words, comparing the possible and desired levels of activities of passenger
vehicles versus airplanes is like comparing apples and oranges.
See, e.g., Abraham & Rabin, supra note 80. This will probably require a combination
of a strict liability regime with an insurance policy, likely a limited one, that will enable
the usage of AI entities despite their safety issues. Id.
Troy Griggs & Daisuke Wakabayashi, How a Self-Driving Uber Killed a Pedestrian
in
Arizona,
THE
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
21,
2018),
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/20/us/self-driving-uber-pedestrian-killed.html
[https://perma.cc/J7M2-GV59].
218
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driver. 221 The safety driver, Rafaela Vasquez, might be facing charges of
vehicular manslaughter, though it is not clear yet whether the police will
indeed press charges. 222 However, it is extremely difficult to expect
Rafaela Vasquez, or any other person in a similar position, to be able to
react in time to such an incident. This situation seems much like security
guards at stores and shopping malls who spend their day in a mindnumbing routine and are expected to spring into action upon a splitsecond notice in case of danger. 223 Together, these considerations
suggest that it is more difficult to place liability on the operator of the
machine rather than the designer or manufacturer, when the former’s
main rule is merely to observe the AI entity’s behavior rather than
dictate or guide it. 224

2. The Vaccination Industry
Those who advocate for comparing the AI industry to the
vaccination industry claim that, much like vaccines, AI entities offer a
net safety gain to society as a whole. 225 The social value of vaccines is
generally undisputed, but they were exposed to many lawsuits before
federal preemption laws were put in place to save the vaccine industry
from bankruptcy. 226 After an $8.5 million verdict was granted in favor of
an injured party who contracted polio from an oral polio vaccine, 227
Congress intervened and legislated the National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act of 1986 which established a system of regulations and
standards for vaccines that limited the liability of vaccine suppliers and
established a fund from which money could be taken in case of injury. 228
As in the aviation context, granting immunity via a no-liability
regime or a limited liability regime, created by legislative protections,
will surely spur innovation. However, it will come at the price of
“diminish[ing], if not eliminat[ing], the incentives for manufacturers to
Chaim Gartenberg, Safety Driver of Fatal Self-Driving Uber Crash was Reportedly
Hulu at Time of Accident, THE VERGE (Jun. 22, 2018),
www.theverge.com/2018/6/22/17492320/safety-driver-self-driving-uber-crash-hulupolice-report [https://perma.cc/L4JV-N55K].
221

Watching
222

Id.

Selbst, supra note 80, at 30; Gadi Perl, Several Thoughts Following the Fatal Uber
Accident in Tempe, THE FEDERMANN CYBER SECURITY CENTER – CYBER LAW

223

PROGRAM (Apr. 11, 2018), www.csrcl.huji.ac.il/people/several-thoughts-following-uberfatal-accident-tempe [https://perma.cc/CS4T-YYP9].
Dana Hull, Mark Bergen, & Gabrielle Coppola, Uber Crash Highlights Odd Job:
Autonomous Vehicle Safety Driver, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 23, 2018),
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-23/uber-crash-highlights-odd-jobautonomous-vehicle-safety-driver [https://perma.cc/W4L7-HUR9].
Weston Kowert, The Foreseeability of Human-Artificial Intelligence Interactions, 96
TEX. L. REV. 181, 195 (2017).
Id.; Marchant & Lindor, supra note 80, at 1331.
Strong v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 261 S.W.3d 493, 521 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1–300aa-34 (2019).
224
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make marginal improvements in the safety of their products in order to
prevent liability.” 229 Marchant and Lindor believe it is preferable to
endure this risk in order to spur AI innovation, specifically in the context
of autonomous vehicles, sooner rather than later, even if it will cause
damages, because even an incomplete autonomous vehicle will be safer
than a human driver. 230 To them, the correct balance between the
positive and negative incentives is a no-liability regime. 231
On the other hand, there is no clear explanation for why the victim,
by herself, should subsidize the damage she endured by these new
technologies. 232 Furthermore, one can claim the mere advocation for a
no-liability regime could actually hurt one’s incentive to innovate. 233 This
does not refer to the general idea of innovating something new, but
rather to the constant refinement and enhancement of an existing
technology that can be improved given the correct set of incentives to
do so.
In Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, a parent of a minor who was allegedly
injured from a diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis vaccine sued the
manufacturer of the vaccine under a product liability claim. 234 The
majority opinion, led by Justice Scalia, ruled against the parents and held
the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act preempts all claims against
the manufacturer. 235 In her dissenting opinion, Justice Sotomayor noted
the relationship between immunity and the lack of incentives to
innovate. 236 She claimed the majority opinion “leaves a regulatory
vacuum in which no one ensures that vaccine manufacturers adequately
take account of scientific and technological advancements when
designing or distributing their products.” 237
This may lead to the lack of internalization of the damages endured
by a no-liability regime, which in turn will advance a failure to update
the technology even when it is possible and desired. 238 This can be
avoided by conditioning a party’s non-liable status by mandating it
implement improvements when possible. 239 However, this solution is
probably economically impractical due to lack of internalization.
Because there is no punishment or accountability, this means there is
no incentive to improve. 240 Society must act to protect activities that are
229
230
231
232
233

Marchant & Lindor, supra note 80, at 1337.
Id. at 1340.
Id.
See CALABRESI, supra note 146, at 116–17.
Kowert, supra note 225, at 199.

234

Bruesewitz v. Wyeth L.L.C., 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011).

235

Id. at 1082.
Id. at 1098 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1086.
See Kowert, supra note 225, at 199.
See id.
Id.
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beneficial to us as a whole but that cannot be at the expense of injured
victims who are left with no remedy. 241 The existence of a fund providing
compensation to the injured party may realize the goals of corrective
justice and fairness to some degree, but it does not achieve the goals of
deterrence and efficient risk allocation.
The airplane industry and the vaccination industry analogies,
which represent to a different degree the no-liability regime, diverge
from the agency analogy, as evident from the differences in the liability
regimes that result from each of them. The government views these two
industries as having high value for society as a whole. 242 In the vaccination
context, the government has detached the inherent connection between
a manufacturer and its products for a cause it considers as worthy at all
cost. 243 Whether we agree with this decision is a question of policy rather
than fact. The rationale that stands behind the decision to disengage the
agency cord is understandable if we agree that vaccinations are beneficial
to all. 244
One can also understand this approach in the context of the
aviation industry but to a lesser extent. Providing a grace period for a
market we consider valuable to everyone in order to allow it to grow
despite foreseeable damages is again a question of policy, in this specific
case an economical one, which we may disagree with. It is true this
immunity period allowed this market to blossom, at the expanse of
human lives, but it blossomed, nonetheless. However, eventually it was
decided that the benefits of a no-liability regime no longer justified the
cost, and that airline companies needed to internalize and take
responsibility for their damages in order to provide better service to
their customers. 245 Today’s technological advancements are far more
progressive than those of 1994, when the General Aviation
Revitalization Act was passed. 246 Providing a no-liability grace period to
AI companies will probably not receive the same support the aviation
industry did, which was controversial at best. 247 It may be offered with
regards to small AI companies, as it was applied to small airplanes, in
order to ensure “small players” can also take part in the race of AI
development, even if they cause damages they cannot pay for. 248
Id. at 203–04.
Id. at 196; Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 217, at 1341.
Kowert, supra note 225, at 196–97.
See id. at 196.
Kerry V. Kovarik, A Good Idea Stretched Too Far: Amending the General Aviation
Revitalization Act to Mitigate Unintended Inequities, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 973, 985

241
242
243
244
245

(2008).
Id. at 983.
See id. at 974; see also Lawrence J. Truitt & Scott E. Tarry, The Rise and Fall of
General Aviation: Product Liability, Market Structure, and Technological Innovation,
34 TRANS. J. 52 (1995).
Kowert, supra note 225, at 198.
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However, this should be dealt with via an anti-trust law channel, rather
than that of torts, so injured parties will receive the remedy they need
and deserve. 249 Our tolerance for innovation at the expense of victims
who remain with no redress has reduced during the years, which lead to
the adaptation of strict liability regime in the first place. 250
A practical argument could be that, if anything, the grace period
for AI companies should have already ended. For example, the
autonomous vehicle has received lenient and convenient regulation
from different states in the United States, allowing its creators to run
experiments at ease with little to no responsibility since 2011. 251 These
laws have already granted these manufactures a grace period which
should have allowed these companies to improve their AI entities in a
contained environment before they were certain these AI entities are
safe enough to be tested in an uncontrolled environment. Therefore, if
any sort of damage did occur, the principal in the chain of the AI entity
development or operation should assume responsibility for their choice
to use the AI entity in an uncontained environment.

E. Final Note—AI as Something Old or New?
AI entities may be treated as something completely new. This
implies creating a new legal entity, doctrine, or category to manage or
facilitate their existence in the fabric of society. 252 Such an approach
would require time in order to fully understand and internalize the place
of these AI entities in our world, which is constantly changing. 253 For this
reason, adopting a completely new analogy to tackle the liability of AI
entities seems less beneficial and more constraining than using an
existing one. Since AI entities are evolving entities which may be treated
as human beings in the future, focusing on discovering a new and
improved analogy may derail our efforts to create a comprehensible and
coherent tort regime for damages that occur now and will occur in the
near future.
On the other side of this spectrum, one can see the damages
inflicted by AI entities just like any other damage inflicted in an accident.
Gary Myers, The Different Treatment of Efficiency and Competition in Antitrust and
Tortious Interference Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1097, 1097–99 (1993) (explaining the

249

differences and conflicts between recovery under antitrust laws and tortious interference
laws).
Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Floodgates of Strict Liability: Bursting Reservoirs
and the Adoption of Fletcher v. Rylands in the Gilded Age, 110 YALE L.J. 333, 377
(2000).
Jayabala, supra note 207, at 378. Nevada began permitting the operation and testing
of autonomous vehicles in 2011, followed by California and Florida. These states had
flexible licensing requirements and left room for future standards to be developed. Id.
Crootof, supra note 64, at 52 (suggesting that a new supplemental law is necessary to
effectively regulate autonomous weapons systems).
Id. at 58–59.
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In this sense, an AI accident is not different from a car accident, a work
accident, or a discriminatory employer. Thus, we should not rely on an
analogy to anything different or new. Adding this layer of fiction, one
can claim, does not contribute to the legal analysis. However, legal
reasoning through analogy is not a fleeting method practiced by courts,
officials, and scholars. It will be extremely difficult to uproot the usage
of this method and not necessarily beneficial to the intersection of law
and technology as a whole. Eventually, every new technology becomes
old, but in order for it to be considered as such, it must first go through
a process of acceptance by society and its institutions. Applying legal
analogies is one of the ways we process its existence. 254
There is a strong argument to be made that the use of legal
analogies in the intersection of AI and tort law is not necessarily
desirable or fruitful. 255 For example, analogizing AI entities to servants
or products leads to the conclusion that the person behind AI entities
are liable. Advocating for a straightforward strict liability regime achieves
the same result, some may say, in a clearer, less fanciful way.
Legal analogies have limitations and may inhibit our ability to
properly regulate AI entities if we continue to view them as something
they are not. 256 Nonetheless, legal analogies can help reveal the most
equitable underlying principle to govern AI liability. They transform the
unintuitive into a common language we can understand. 257
Judges do not have to be experts in specific fields; however, they
must possess tools and instruments to enable them to analyze the
scenario in front of them despite this lack of expertise. 258 Legal analogies
supply these tools and create a legal language all can share and
understand. 259 They help bridge the gap created by this deficiency and
provide the court, the legislature, and executive officials with the
appropriate tools and instruments they need to utilize legal reasoning by
analogy. 260
Throughout this section, the back and forth voyage has been put
into the test in our search for the desired equilibrium point. This section
reviewed the possible analogies, the values that stand behind them and
their application in specific cases. This section demonstrates that many
suggestions do not reach the equilibrium point this Article wishes to
attain. Their specific application does not fulfill the general principle
254
255

See supra Part II, Section C.
See generally Crootof, supra note 64 (stating that when there is no appropriate legal

analogy, a new analogy or set of rules must be created).
See supra Part II, Section B.
Blavin & Cohen, supra note 48, at 267 (stating “[w]hen courts encounter new
technologies not yet anticipated by the law, their reliance on analogical reasoning plays
a profoundly important role in the application of proper legal rules.”).
See AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 101–07 (2006).
Blavin & Cohen, supra note 48, at 266–67.
See id. at 266 (stating that metaphors can be used to answer questions about new social
and legal problems).
256
257
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which stands behind the usage of the analogy and they cannot be
adjusted by their mutual influence without undermining themselves. As
of now, it seems that only the analogy of agency reaches harmony
between the general principles and specific instances of AI entities
inflicting harm. Our voyage has led us to our warranted discussion about
the legal analogy of AI agent-servant and its application to AI entities’
liability.
IV. TREATING AI ENTITIES AS AGENTS-SERVANTS
On the one hand, the AI agent-servant analogy is the most
appropriate approach to the analysis of AI entities. On the other hand,
there is something inherently false about this analogy as AI entities are
not real servants, and they were never created to be as such. 261 The true
application of this servant analogy is less about the similarities of an
agent and an AI entity in a deep sense, and more about the legal
meaning that stands behind it—that is, the direct applicability of strict
liability with regards to the harmful actions of a servant under the control
and care of its principal. 262
The reasons and values, which stand behind this normative choice,
states that there are scenarios in which it is appropriate to treat AI users
as more than just property owners. They may hold the ability and
responsibility to do more in order to prevent damages and harms than
mere product owners. Given this, our regulatory structure should create
incentives to make sure these AI users and manufacturers do so. A strict
liability regime aligned with the respondeat superior doctrine will enable
this to happen. Furthermore, a servant, which is a sub-category of an
agent, is unique in that it acts under the direct control and supervision
of its master, unlike other forms of agency which have greater discretion
to make independent decisions. 263

An exception to this is servant-robots. See, e.g., Evan Ackerman, Care-O-Bot 4 is the
Robot Servant We All Want but Probably Can’t Afford, IEEE SPECTRUM (Jan. 29,

261

2015), www.spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/home-robots/care-o-bot-4-mobilemanipulator [https://perma.cc/DSB2-DK78] (describing a robot that can help with
household tasks); Evan Selinger, Robot Servants are Going to Make Your Life Easy,
Then They’ll Ruin it, WIRED (Sept. 5, 2014), www.wired.com/2014/09/robot-servantsare-going-to-make-your-life-easy-then-theyll-ruin-it/
[https://perma.cc/LD5S-QG38]
(describing a “Jetsons”-style “family robot”).
See Kerl v. Rasmussen, 682 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Wis. 2004) (“Vicarious liability under
the doctrine of respondeat superior depends upon the existence of a master/servant
agency relationship.”).
CRAIG B. GLIDDEN, 4 WEST’S TEXAS FORMS, BUSINESS LITIGATION Ch. 15
Introduction (2d ed. 2019 update). In some instances, courts have held that there is no
legal difference between an agent and a servant. See, e.g., Murray v. Hills Cab Co., 198
N.E.2d 466 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963), but it seems to have some factual importance in the
way we describe the nature of a relationship.
262
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The Restatement (Second) of Agency sets a few criteria to help
determine “who is a servant.” 264 These include, inter alia,
(a) the extent of control which . . . the master may exercise over the
details of the work; . . . (c) the kind of occupation with reference to
whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of
the employer . . . (d) the skill required in the particular occupation; . . .
(f) the length of time . . . (i) whether or not the parties believe they are
creating the relationship of master and servant. 265
The AI agent fulfils the vast majority of these criteria in its
relationship with its human principal, given its unique features and lack
of independence in choosing tasks. For example, the human principal
has great control over the assignments of her AI agent. Given the nature
of the agent, its actions are carried out under the direction and discretion
of the principal, and the AI agent is specifically crafted with a particular
set of skills to accomplish specific assignments given to it by its principal
266
for as long as the AI agent is operational.
Of course, the analogy is not perfect, and it raises a difficult set of
questions, the most important one is who should be viewed as the
principal in the relationship with an AI entity. Is it the manufacturer of
the AI entity, the humans who purchased the AI entity, a third party
who loaned the AI entity from its owner or creator (much like a
borrowed car or tool), or maybe someone else entirely? What follows
is a discussion of these questions and others about the application of the
agency theory on AI entities and its direct connection to enforcing a
strict liability regime when damages occur.

A. The Meaning and Purpose of the Term “Agent”
Even scholars that advocate for legal analogies other than agency,
or for no specific analogy at all, often use the term “AI agents.” 267 This
indicates the existence of a gap, or at the very least inconsistency, in the
usage of the term in the legal context.
The Restatement (Third) of Agency defines agency as:
the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a
‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’)
that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to

264

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1958).

265

Id.

This is a main feature of narrow AI, which is the prevalent type in today’s market. See
Tannya D. Jajal, Distinguishing Between Narrow AI, General AI and Super AI,
MEDIUM (May 20, 2018), www.medium.com/@tjajal/distinguishing-between-narrow-aigeneral-ai-and-super-ai-a4bc44172e22 [https://perma.cc/CR5U-NXDK] (describing
narrow AI as that which is capable of performing a single specific task at any given time).
See, e.g., CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 103; Balkin, supra note 3; Cofone, supra
note 192.
266
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the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or
otherwise consents so to act. 268
Black’s law dictionary defines agency as “[a] fiduciary relationship
created by express or implied contract or by law, in which one party (the
agent) may act on behalf of another party (the principal) and bind that
other party by words or actions.” 269 But outside of the realm of law, and
sometimes even within it, agency can take on a different form and refer
to an organization, company, or bureau that provides service. 270 Munday
states the “word ‘agent’ is often ‘used indiscriminately to describe
individuals and entities whose activities, in strict legal terms, are not
actually governed by the law of agency.’” 271
When the phrase AI agents is used, most scholars refer merely to
an entity based on AI technology, which is capable of performing any
basic action, such as being active. Similarly, the term “chemical agents,”
for example, refers to active chemical substances which possess the
ability to hurt by the nature of their activity. 272 Others use the word
agents, and agency in general, in the context of sentient beings who can
think and have an agenda and purpose of their own. 273
In contrast, this Article uses the term to describe AI entities as
agents in a relationship with their fellow human principals—that is why
thus far this Article described them in a generic non-anthropomorphism
term by referring to them as “entities” in an attempt to differentiate the
general features attributed to an AI entity. All of these uses are
applicable and acceptable, but their usage must be more careful and
mindful. They express very different concepts of the way AI entities
should legally be treated and using the term interchangeably may lead
to confusion in robotic and AI law. Furthermore, even if the term
“agency” is used accurately and coherently within its legal sense in order
to describe a legal relationship between an agent and a principal, it does

268

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).

269

Agency, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
Agency,
CAMBRIDGE

DICTIONARY,
http://www.dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/agency
[https://perma.cc/344E-WJKA].
RODERICK MUNDAY, AGENCY: LAW AND PRINCIPLES 1–2 (3rd ed., 2016). Munday
goes on to quote Lord Herschell, stating that “[n]o word is more commonly and
constantly abused than the word ‘agent.’” Id. at 2 (quoting Kennedy v. De Trafford
[1897] AC 180, 188).
What is a Chemical Weapon?, ORGANIZATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS,
https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/Fact_Sheets/English/Fact_
Sheet_4_-_CW_types.pdf [https://perma.cc/GR5G-7CGS] (stating that “[t]he toxic
component of a chemical weapon is called ‘chemical agent.’”).
See Cofone, supra note 192, at 183 (stating that since A.I. robots lack agency, they
cannot effectively be held civilly or criminally liable for their actions).
270
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not necessarily mean the same narrow rules will apply to different types
of AI agents. 274

B. Who is the Principal?
The question of identifying and naming the principal is not a
simple one to answer, due to the unique structure of the AI industry and
the many human hands that are a part of the development,
manufacturing, training, and operation of an AI entity. It may be the
case that a specific AI agent will have multiple principals over the course
of its existence, and it is important to identify the appropriate one, or
ones, in a given situation.

1. The Possible Approaches to Identify the Principal
To name the appropriate principal in case of an accident, two
possible approaches should be considered. First, analyze the specific
task at hand that the AI entity is in charge of completing and who is the
person who sent it to complete that specific task. 275 Second, observe who
has the highest capacity and capability to affect the actions of an AI entity
in means of monitor, supervision, and guidance. 276
A good example for the first approach can be found in the Israeli
agency legislation, that is its Agency (Shlicot) Law. 277 This law states that
the agent-principal relationship applies on every action which is
reasonably necessary for the proper execution of the subject of the
mission, when there is no limitation on the authorization given to the
agent. 278 Furthermore, the law states that an agent is permitted to carry
out any urgent and unpredictable action which is reasonably required in
order to safeguard the matters of the sender (i.e., principal), which is
related to the subject of the mission, even if these actions exceed its
authorization limitations. 279 The emphasis here is on the mission given
to the agent by its principal and the acts the former had to carry out in
order to fulfil that specific mission. If, in the course of conducting the

MUNDAY, supra note 271, at 3 (“[S]pecific rules and customs may apply to different
species of agent.”).
See, e.g., Agency Law, 5725-1965, 19 L.S.I. 231§ 1(a) (Isr.) [hereinafter Israeli Agency
Law] (stating that agency is the grant of power to act in the place or name of the
principal).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01, cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (stating
that the principal instructs and controls the agent).
Israeli Agency Law, supra note 275.
Id. at § 5(a) (stating that “[a]gency extends—unless limited by the authorisation—to any
act reasonably required for the proper carrying out of its object”).
Id. at § 5(b) (stating that “[a]n agent may do any urgent and unforeseen act reasonably
required for safeguarding the interests of the principal in connection with the object of
the agency even if such act exceeds the scope of the authorisation.”).
274
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mission, a harm was inflicted, the principal who sent the agent on the
mission is liable. 280
The second approach is the American one, according to the
definition of agency in the Restatement (Third) of Agency. 281 This
approach takes a broader look at the situation and examines the
correlation between the principal and agent, as well as the former’s
ability to control and guide the latter. 282 The focus is on the nature of the
relationship between the agent and principal rather than on the specific
mission at hand. 283 It seems this approach is more appropriate in the AI
context because the AI entity is not necessarily an agent sent to complete
a specific mission or task, but rather it is in a constant state of “being an
agent” for the benefit of others, mainly of its principal, similar to the
behavior of a servant.
Moreover, this approach focuses on the question of where is the
greatest pressure point for who is willing and able to take into
consideration the costs its AI agent may inflict. Based on these costs,
that person—that is, the principal—is in the best position to make a
decision whether to better equip and train the AI agent, or to pay the
price in the form of a monetary sanction or an insurance premium.
Given the relatively low number of options for identifying the principal,
the administrative costs associated with naming her should not exceed
the administrative costs associated with adjudicating each case as a
negligence claim. Thus, this approach seems to be the most efficient in
the AI liability context. 284
When we discuss human servants, we can roughly divide their lives
into two separate parts: the agent share and the autonomous share.
While the former refers to performing the tasks assigned by the
principal, the latter refers to anything in that servant’s life which is not
related to her agency role and is not under the control or guidance of
her principal. This separation does not exist when we discuss AI entities.
They do not possess an autonomous part of their existence, but only a
mono-purpose aspect. A human servant’s main mission is to complete
the orders her principal provides; however, they eventually have a
sperate part of existence where they are in charge of and are responsible
for their own actions, decisions and mistakes, outside the realm of their
See infra Part IV, Section B.3 (explaining that in the AI context, the idea that a
principal is responsible for an agent’s actions is not applicable with relation to intentional
torts conducted by the agent).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). The Israeli
and American approaches were examined because they best represent the continuum
between the two possible approaches within the common law system.
See Susan P. Shapiro, Agency Theory, 31 ANN. REV. SOC. 263, 273 (2005) (stating
that principal control is critical in the law of agency).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. d (stating that agency is a
consensual relationship).
See CALABRESI, supra note 146, at 225 (expanding on administrative costs).
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missions as servants. AI entities do not “enjoy” this luxury. They are
agents from the moment they were switched on (creation of agency) until
the moment they will be switched off (termination of agency). 285 Given
this, no specific mission dictates their behavior, but rather the ongoing
services they provide to their principals as their ongoing servants.

2. Creation and Termination of an AI agency
Agency is created by contract (i.e., consent of the parties to enter
such a relationship even if no written contract was signed) or is created
as a matter of law (i.e., implied from circumstances). 286 There are no
rigid and formal requirements for the creation of an agency, which
supports the notion this relationship can be established with AI entities
on the agent end. 287 The mere existence of AI entities and their
affiliation with their principal leads to the application of agency, even if
the agent itself has not given its explicit consent to this relationship, an
already problematic concept in the AI realm. 288 Unlike traditional
agency, the AI entity’s sole purpose is its role as an agent. Therefore,
the creation of an agency starts from the creation of the AI entity itself
or, rather, its activation. This directly connects to the mono-purpose
agenda of the AI entity presented earlier, which differentiates traditional
agency from AI agency.
The AI agent can only be terminated if the principal chooses to
end the agency, because even if it could choose, its choice is really only
one it was already programmed for. 289 Either the AI entity is out of
commission or is reassigned to another principal (either by choice or
death of the former principal), thus only terminating a specific agency
relationship of the AI entity out of a continuum of agencies.

While AI may not yet have the luxury of being in charge of itself, there are arguments
for creating AI in such a way that it has free will. See Alzbeta Krausova & Hananel
Hazan, Creating Free Will in Artificial Intelligence, in Proceedings of the International
Conference Beyond AI 96, 107 (2013) (arguing that artificial intelligence should include
free will but that it would be highly complex and the results would be uncertain); see
also Cindy Van Rossum, Liability of Robots: Legal Responsibility in Cases of Errors or
Malfunctioning (2018) (unpublished L.L.M. paper, Ghent University),
https://lib.ugent.be/fulltxt/RUG01/002/479/449/RUG01002479449_2018_0001_AC.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VWA-G6XD] (noting that one
hundred percent autonomous robots do not exist yet).
MUNDAY, supra note 271, at 15–16.
Id. at 12; HOWARD BENNETT, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 2 (2013).
CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 103, at 29. The notion of robot consent is also raised
in the context of whether sex robots can consent. See generally Frank & Nyholm, supra
note 145; Laura Bates, The Trouble with Sex Robots, THE N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2017),
www.nytimes.com/2017/07/17/opinion/sex-robots-consent.html
[https://perma.cc/6T3F-BVLR].
Rossum, supra note 285, at 18 (stating that even robots which decide to do something
are actually responding to situations for which they were programmed).
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However, the human agent has other options to terminate the
relationship which are not available to an AI agent. For example, the
agent can choose to terminate it, 290 the agreed period of the agency can
come to an end, or the agent can accomplish her allotted task. 291 The
latter two are inapplicable in the AI agent context, due to the specificpurpose feature of AI agents, which is unlimited by time or specificity
of a task. Termination by operation of law can also come into effect if
the principal or agent dies, the principal becomes mentally
incapacitated, or the principal becomes insolvent. 292 All of these may
very well happen in the case of an AI agent but that only terminates a
specific agency within the life span of the AI entity. The death,
insolvency, or mental incapacitation of the principal will only lead to a
change in the identities of the potential principals, not to the end of the
AI entity’s role as an agent.
These unique features of an AI entity, mostly its mono-purpose
agenda which substantially effects the creation and termination of AI
agency, strengthen our conclusion that the second approach, which
focuses on the relationship of the agent (servant) principal rather than
on a specific mission, is a more appropriate approach to take to find the
specific principal that is in control of the AI servant in a given situation,
and thus liable for its indiscretions. This approach suits the monopurpose feature—the focus is on the AI agent and its correlation to
possible interchanging human principals. The ending of one
relationship does not cancel the grander scheme of the AI’s purpose to
serve, thus it will help us identify the appropriate principal by focusing
on the AI agent itself and on its obligations to its principal, rather than
on its mission.

3. Fiduciary Duties
Another aspect of the agent-principal relationship is the obligations
the agent owes the principal (e.g., fiduciary duties), vis-à-vis the control
and guidance of the principal over its agent. 293 Identifying who owes
fiduciary duties may also be used once we are trying to identify the
appropriate principal. However, this index is harder to measure and
utilize in order to identify the principal because the AI entities are not
programmed to act in a specific way towards its principal. An AI entity
usually treats its human surroundings in the same manner, unless it is
programmed otherwise. Thus, pointing to a specific human as its
principal based on the duties it owes her may prove to be a confusing
measurement in our search for the appropriate principal and an
This choice may no longer be reserved to humans if AI entities are eventually able to
express and execute free choice.
MUNDAY, supra note 271, at 34.
Id. at 14.
BENNETT, supra note 287, at 85; MUNDAY, supra note 271, at 11.
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inherent limitation of the analogy of agency. If it was specifically
programmed to owe fiduciary duties to a specific entity (i.e.,
programmed to be loyal), we need to question who decided to program
it this way and whether it is really an indication of the appropriate
principal. Otherwise, it is of no added value in helping us to identify the
principal.
The concept of fiduciary duties is meant to prevent, control, and
minimize the intrinsic conflict of interests that lays in the basis of the
relationship between a human agent and a human principal. 294 This
conflict rises once the interest of a human agent diverges from that of
the principal in a manner that leads the agent to act on behalf of her
personal interests, rather than those of her principal. 295 These are not
common in the AI context. AI agents do not have their own personal
interests but rather only those which were assigned to them as part of
their mono-purpose agenda. The problem that may arise once an AI
agent is dispatched is not that of conflicting interest and loyalty but rather
excessive loyalty. 296 This may lead the AI agent to take bizarre or extreme
measures in order to achieve the assigned task and, in the process, can
cause damages for the sake of the assignment. This principle is also
relevant in the context of intentional torts which are not applicable to AI
agents because their actions will always be for the purpose of promoting
the agenda of another person—their principal. 297
The fact that we cannot guarantee the existence of fiduciary
relationships between the AI agent and the human principal does not
undermine the agency analogy because there is no conflict of interest
between the agent and the principal to justify the existence of a fiduciary
See Robert Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, 32 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 393, 420 (2007) (stating that fiduciary duties can prevent “mischief”).
Definition
of
Principal/Agent
Problem,
FINANCIAL
TIMES,
http://markets.ft.com/research/Lexicon/Term?term=principal%2Fagent-problem
[https://perma.cc/U7EZ-SF37] (“Agency problems arise when the incentives between
the agent and the principal are not perfectly aligned and conflicts of interest arise. As a
result, the agent may be tempted to act in his or her own interest rather than the
principal’s. Conflicts of interest are almost inevitable.”).
See, e.g., Curtis E.A. Karnow, The Application of Traditional Tort Theory to
Embodied Machine Intelligence, in ROBOT L. 1, 1 (Ryan Calo, et al. eds. 2013) (stating
“[a]sk a humanoid robot to reach his right hand to touch his left ear. In most of the
cases I saw – the robot tried to get to the left ear through the head.”).
Once a human agent commits an intentional tort, she is solely liable for her behavior
and the principal will not be held liable. There are three exceptions to this rule: if the
conduct was (1) specifically authorized by the principal; (2) natural from the nature of
the employment; (3) motivated by a desire to serve the principal. All of these exceptions
are applicable in the AI context given the agency relationship. See Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756 (1998); Doe v. Forrest, 853 A.2d 48, 67 (2004);
Dianne Rosky, Respondeat Inferior: Determining the United States’ Liability for the
Intentional Torts of Federal Law Enforcement Officials, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 895,
903–04 (2003); see also PAGALLO, supra note 3, at 120 (elaborating on intentional torts
in the AI context).
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relationship in the first place. This lack of fiduciary duties also shows
the existing gap between the agency analogy in the human context and
that in the AI context. This gap emphasizes the importance of the strict
liability regime that stands behind the agency analogy and its
applicability in the AI context, rather than the perfect adequacy of the
analogy itself.
298

4. The Problem with Identifying the Principal
While discussing Rawls’s reflective equilibrium and its utilization
in finding the appropriate analogy for AI entities, a productivemanageable problem arose in the form of identifying the appropriate
principal or principals in a given situation. 299 An ex-ante approach to
regulating the identity of the principal in advance is not a productive
path to take, despite its benefit in minimizing administrative costs, due
to various degrees of control and guidance each entity has under
different circumstances which cannot be dictated in advance. 300 Deciding
the identity of the principal in advance, with no consideration to a given
situation, disrupts the meaning of the agency analogy and the back and
forth reasoning that leads us to it and will continue to develop it in the
future. In order to find the best-suited principal, the pendulum must
swing back and forth until it finds its equilibrium position. 301 Forcing it
to stay in one place will prevent us from reaching that much desired
equilibrium. 302 No single across-the-board rule can be decided on and
applied with regards to a predefined entity. Each case should be
examined separately to identify the principal given the agency
relationship.
The identity of the principal will change per instance and will
heavily depend on the circumstances of the accident. This will include
consideration of factors, such as the level of involvement, supervision,
monitoring, and ability to direct the actions of the AI agent in light of
the damage that ensued. 303 At the early stages of an AI agent
development, this level of control will be attributed more frequently to
See Vladeck, supra note 91, at 146 (elaborating on strict liability in the AI context);
see also Steven Shavell, On the Redesign of Accident Liability for the World of
Autonomous Vehicles, (NBER Working Paper No. 26220, 2019),
298

http://www.nber.org/papers/w26220 [https://perma.cc/95G6-DRN5 ] (suggesting a new
form of strict liability in an autonomous vehicles context).
See supra Part II, Section A.
See CALABRESI, supra note 146; HALLEVY, supra note 74, at 185–229 (explaining the
sanctioning of AI entities in the criminal context).
See RAWLS, supra note 7, at 48 (explaining how going back and forth allows us to find
an accurate description of the initial situation).
Id. at 76 (arguing that it is a mistake to focus on a single transaction viewed in isolation).
This Article has discussed several possible principals: owner, operator, designer,
trainer, programmer, and user. As the AI entity progresses, each potential principal will
become more or less involved due to their role and job duties.
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the designer, programmer, trainer, or manufacture of the AI agent
rather than its operator or owner. 304 The more the usage of these AI
agents becomes pervasive, the more likely the operator’s or owner’s
level of control and monitoring will result in identifying her as the
appropriate principal.
Respondeat superior does not require the principal to be at fault,
but rather that an agent performed a task that was within the realm of
authority given to it by their principal. 305 Our ability to properly identify
the correct principal according to this analogy will evolve over time and
depend on the connections of control and supervision the AI entity has
with its environment.
An interestingly complex scenario can arise if an AI agent inflicts
damages because it was hacked and controlled from afar by someone
other than those identified as the potential principals. 306 In this case, the
hacker is the ad-hoc principal for the damages, but in most cases, it will
be difficult to locate and prosecute her. However, the hacking itself can
be seen as the tortious act that lead to the damages. Therefore, it will be
difficult to hold the operator or owner liable given their low ability of
control to prevent hacking. The designer, programmer, or manufacturer
should be seen as the more appropriate principal in this scenario and
therefore the liable party. 307

5. Multiple Principals
There will be cases where an AI agent inflicts damages while it is
under the control and guidance of more than one principal. These two
304
305

See supra Part III, Section D (discussing the Uber autonomous vehicle accident).
See Gary S. Green, Respondeat Superior, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA

https://www.britannica.com/topic/respondeat-superior [https://perma.cc/GK8C-SH74]
(stating that liability comes when an agent commits a crime while acting within the scope
of the agent’s authority and with an intent to benefit the corporation).
See Alan Butler, Products Liability and the Internet of (Insecure) Things: Should
Manufacturers Be Liable for Damage Caused by Hacked Devices, 50 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 913, 914 (2017) (discussing the increasing incidence of connected devices
being hacked); Mark A. Geistfeld, A Roadmap for Autonomous Vehicles: State Tort
Liability, Automobile Insurance, and Federal Safety Regulation, 105 CALIF. L. REV.
1611, 1660 (2017) (discussing the potential for autonomous vehicles to be hacked and
controlled by an unauthorized user); Evelyne Studer & Jacques De Werra, Regulating
Cybersecurity: What Civil Liability in Case of Cyber-Attacks?, DROIT 511, 512–514
(2017) (discussing the question of who is liable when a device is hacked and examining
the repercussions of these types of hacks); John G. Browning & Shawn Tuma, If Your
306

Heart Skips a Beat, It May Have Been Hacked: Cybersecurity Concerns with Implanted
Medical Devices, 67 S. C. L. REV. 637, 638 (2016) (discussing the potential for medical
devices to be hacked).
This short discussion is not exhaustive with regard to the process of identifying the
appropriate principal in a hacking situation. It is only meant as an anecdote to present
the complexity of the situation and the unpredictable parties that may be added to the
potential principals.
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or more principals are referred to as “multiple principals” and can be
viewed as joint principals who are in co-control over the AI agent’s
activities. 308
Article 41 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency discusses this
issue of several principals under the title “interpretation of authority
where principals or agents are joint.” 309 It states in sub-section (1) that
“[u]nless otherwise agreed, authority given by two or more principals
jointly includes only authority to act for their joint account.” 310 This
notion repeats in article 3.16 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency,
which states “[t]wo or more persons may as coprincipals appoint an
agent to act for them in the same transaction or matter.” 311 Article 17(b)
of the Israeli agency legislation also deals with this situation. It states that
“[w]here one authorization is given by several principals, it shall be
presumed that the agent is to act by the joint authority of all of them.” 312
The Louisiana Civil Code states in Section 3015 that “[m]ultiple
principals for an affair common to them are solidarity bound to their
mandatary.” 313 This legislation presents multiple principals as an issue
that is handled via joint and several liability. This is also the case
according to the French Civil Code. 314
All principals have a role in the actions of the AI agent. This Article
named several potential principals: owner, operator, designer, trainer,
and programmer. When more than one entity can be identified as the
AI’s principal, all the relevant principals should be held liable for the
damage that occurred jointly and severally.
This situation of multiple principals is a part of the abovementioned productive problem that stands at the heart of the AI agency
reflective equilibrium process: identifying the appropriate principal in a
given case. 315 Finding the principal or principals is not an easy task. One
AI agent can be under similar or different degrees of control from
various principals. 316 Only by reasoning back and forth can one identify
the appropriate entity to be held liable as the AI agent’s principal. 317 An
alternative is to legislate ex-ante the identity of the principal. In this
308
309
310

Scherer, supra note 80, at 287.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 41 (AM. LAW INST. 1958).

Id.

311

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.16 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).

312

See Israeli Agency Law, supra note 275.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3015 (2019).
See CODE CIVIL art. 2002 (Fr.) (“Where an agent has been appointed by several
persons, for a common affair, each of them is jointly and severally liable towards him
for all the effects of the agency.”).
See supra Part IV, Section B.4.
See supra note 303 (noting that some possible principals are: owner, operator,
designer, trainer, programmer, and user).
See generally RAWLS, supra note 7, at 48 (explaining how back and forth reasoning
works).
313
314

315
316

317

2020]

AI ENTITIES AS AI AGENTS

1095

context, as discussed above, given the identification process of the
principal, this type of legislation seems inaccurate. 318 Naming one or
more entities as constantly liable will fail to take advantage of the many
benefits agency law has to offer via its principal’s incentives, once we
apply it on the relationship between AI agents and those who control
them.
The structure of multiple principals is possible and recognized, as
we can see from the various agency legislations, and it is an important
tool to utilize in the AI entity context given the many human hands
which have varying degrees of control and guidance over these agents. 319
The back and forth reasoning process will allow us to find the
appropriate principal, as it led us to the appropriate legal analogy, it will
eventually do the same with regards to the apt human principal itself. 320
This is a productive dilemma which is manageable by our legal system
and should find its answer via our legal reasoning process, which ensures
the principal will not be arbitrarily or rigorously chosen. 321
Two examples will assist us in better understanding the application
of agency and multiple principals when AI agents cause damages. The
first involves an autonomous shopping mall guard robot running over
an infant while patrolling the parking lot. 322 In the second case, a hiring
algorithm selected only a specific segment of the population as worthy
of hiring, and its results were adopted by a tech company. 323 These cases
represent two types of tortious damages—physical harm to a person in
the first example and discrimination and disparate impact in the second.
In order to simplify the first example, assume the owner and
operator of the robot is the mall itself and not an outside company, and
that they choose the path of the robot’s patrol. Examining who has
greater control and supervisory ability to monitor the actions of the
robot will most likely lead us to name the mall as the principal, assuming
it sent the robot to complete the task of patrolling and has the ability to
monitor its actions from afar. However, it is possible the mall will not
be named the sole principal of the robot if the designer or programmer
of the robot was already aware of this malfunction and failed to update
318
319

See supra Part IV, Section B.4.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 41 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (defining

authority in the context of joint principals or agents).
See RAWLS, supra note 7, at 48.
Id. at 5 (“[I]nstitutions are just when no arbitrary distinctions are made between
persons in the assigning of basic rights and duties.”)
Steve Hoffer, 300-Pound Security Robot Runs Over Toddler at California Shopping
Center, HUFFPOST (July 13, 2016), www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/security-robottoddler_us_57863670e4b03fc3ee4e8f3a [https://perma.cc/G5LF-8734].
Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1040 (2017);
Jessica Leber, The Machine-Readable Workforce, MIT TECH. REV. (May 27, 2013),
www.technologyreview.com/s/514901/the-machine-readable-workforce/
[https://perma.cc/XB2D-WY85] (describing Xerox’s approach as of 2013).
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the software accordingly. The operator or owner does not have the
ability to do that, thus the burden of liability should be spread between
these two principals in light of their respective ability to oversee the
behavior and actions of the AI agent-guard.
In the second example, we assume the tech company is the
operator but not the owner of the algorithm. It is reasonable to assume
this company had a say with regards to the metrics they hold dear in an
attempt to optimize the algorithm’s result for their purpose. 324 In this
case, the tech company had the ability to monitor and guide the actions
of the algorithms. The decisions of the algorithm by themselves are
discriminatory, but the decision to implement those decisions were of
the company and not of the other entities that may be considered to be
principals. 325 It is true the tech company could not have predicted the
discriminatory results of the algorithm given the metrics it chose, but if
it decided to implement its recommendation, they should be viewed as
the sole principal of the AI agent. Alternatively, if the algorithm was
given to the company with a built-in metric system decided upon by the
designer or programmer and implemented by the tech company, there
would have been a better case for multiple principals and shared
responsibility between the tech company and the creators of the
algorithm. 326

C. The Respondeat Superior Doctrine
Establishing the premise that an AI entity creates an agency
relationship with its surroundings, this Article turns to discuss the
implied connection between strict liability regime and agency law via the
respondeat superior doctrine (“let the master answer”), that is, vicarious
liability. 327
This doctrine is based on the notion that if a principal entrusts
subordinates, in our case AI agents, with “inherently risk-bearing
activities, fairness requires the superior to assume responsibility for the
conduct of its subordinates in carrying out their duties.” 328 In practice,
324
325

Id. (noting that Xerox valued improvement of tenure).
Id. (stating that Xerox chose not to implement the discriminatory decisions).

These two examples are oversimplified and are only meant to present the process of
thought of the agent-principal application. Many other assumptions will change the
outcomes in the analysis. They are to be taken as basic instances to the application of
the agency analogy but they in no way diminish the complexity of identifying the
appropriate agent.
See Kristopher-Kent Harris, Drones: Proposed Standards of Liability, 35 SANTA
CLARA HIGH TECH. L. J. 65, 74–81 (2018) (analyzing the respondeat superior doctrine
with regards to drones); Dafni Lima, Could AI Agents Be Held Criminally Liable:
Artificial Intelligence and the Challenges for Criminal Law, 69 S. C. L. REV. 677, 692
(2018) (analyzing the respondeat superior doctrine as applied to AI entities for criminal
responsibility).
BENNETT, supra note 287, at 161.
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one can claim the principal is in a better position to endure the damage
or acquire insurance against potential liability claims than the agent itself
(i.e., the principal is the best pressure point to incentivize). 329 This can
also motivate the principal to choose its agents more carefully and invest
more time and efforts in their selection, training, and subsequent
monitoring. 330 This doctrine is designed in part to ensure tort victims will
not be undercompensated due to an insolvent agent. 331 This rationale is
particularly important when we discuss AI agents because they are
inherently insolvent. 332
Applying strict liability in the form of respondeat superior ensures
the principal will be better able to control and adjust the levels of activity
of her AI agent. Influencing one’s levels of activity is not plausible in a
negligence regime, which puts most of its weight on the question of
See BENNETT, supra note 287, at 44.
BENNETT, supra note 287, at 44. Several examples of this idea have been noted by
courts. In Kerl v. Rasmussen the court declared that:
Vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior depends upon the
existence of a master/servant agency relationship. Vicarious liability under respondeat
superior is a form of liability without fault -- the imposition of liability on an innocent
party for the tortious conduct of another based upon the existence of a particularized
agency relationship. As such, it is an exception to our fault-based liability system, and is
imposed only where the principal has control or the right to control the physical conduct
of the agent such that a master/servant relationship can be said to exist.
682 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Wis. 2004). Likewise, Convit v. Wilson explained that:
We begin with the legal principles that will guide our analysis. “Vicarious liability . . . is
merely a legal concept used to transfer liability from an agent to a principal[,]” and
includes the theory of respondeat superior as developed in agency law. Under that
theory, the responsibility of an agent for his own legally careless action is imputed to the
principal. Thus, we have said that “in cases involving derivative liability under the
doctrine of respondeat superior, the master’s liability is limited to that of the servant, the
only active tortfeasor . . . .”
980 A.2d 1104, 1114 (D.C. 2009); see also Judah v. Reiner, 744 A.2d 1037, 1039–40
(D.C. 2000) (stating that to show liability of a principal, it must be shown that an agency
relationship exists and the agent was acting within the scope of the agency relationship);
Giles v. Shell Oil Corp., 487 A.2d 610, 611 (D.C. 1985) (stating that to succeed under
a respondeat superior theory, the existence of a master-servant relationship must be
shown and that the employee was acting in the scope of his employment when the harm
occurred); Smith v. Jenkins, 452 A.2d 333, 335 (D.C. 1982) (stating that “[g]enerally an
agency relationship results when one person authorizes another to act on his behalf
subject to his control, and the other consents to do so”). Other decisions focus on
consent and control as a key component of the agency relationship. See, e.g., Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Troyer v. Nat’l Futures Ass’n, 290 F. Supp.
3d 874 (N.D. Ind. 2018); Tillman v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, No. 16CV-1335-PP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178749 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 27, 2016); Henderson v.
Charles E. Smith Management, Inc., 567 A.2d 59, 62 (D.C. 1989).
Justin Sevier, Vicarious Windfalls, 102 IOWA L. REV. 651, 660 (2017).
Wein, supra note 142, at 110 (“The obligation to make restitution falls on the master
as the financially responsible individual, rather than on the servant as the morally
responsible party.”). However, in the AI context, it is difficult to view AI agents as
“morally responsible” for their actions. Id.
329
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whether the harmful action fulfilled the duty of care obligation. 333 Strict
liability, on the other hand, enables the principals to expand their
control on the scope of the activity. 334 This incentivizes them to better
train and guide their AI agents in an attempt to reach the optimal level
of activity via the internalization of the costs associated with these high
levels of activity. 335
To establish the respondeat superior doctrine, there should be an
appropriate relationship between the superior and its subordinate, and
an appropriate connection between that relationship and the conduct of
the subordinate which leads to the damage. 336 In order to decide whether
vicarious liability should apply in a specific case, the common test courts
utilize examines whether the agent was acting “in the course of the
employment,” when the damage occurred. 337 This is meant to create a
distinction between acts carried out by the agent for which the principal
will not be held liable and those acts for which she will. 338 In the AI
context, this distinction does not exist, as there are no acts that can be
carried out by the AI agents that will exceed the liability scope of the
principal given their mono-purpose and “excessive loyalty” traits.
The Restatement (Third) of Agency discusses a principal’s liability
for an agent operating within the “scope of employment.” 339 It states that
“[a]n employee acts within the scope of employment when preforming
See, e.g., Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 270
(1996).
A major criticism of strict liability is that eventually everyone insures themselves and
they will be covered for damages. Therefore, it may not mean anything. While it may
be impossible, or at the very least difficult, to discuss strict liability without discussing the
effects insurance law has on this liability regime, in the framework of this article, it cannot
be done and will be reserved for a future project. See, e.g., Anat Lior, Insurability of
Artificial Intelligence Algorithms and Robots – A Different Version of the Same Policy,
THE FEDERMANN CYBER SECURITY CENTER– CYBER LAW PROGRAM (Aug. 5, 2019),
csrcl.huji.ac.il/blog/anat-lior-Insurability-AI). It is sufficient to say that moral hazards
have yet to undermine strict liability as an appropriate and apt regime and insurance
companies have found, and will find again, ways to incentivize policy holders to manage
their risk in a cautious way, such as premiums, caps, and deductibles. See id.; Tom
Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways that Liability Insurance Shapes
Tort Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (2005); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis
of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986); Daniel Keating, Pension Insurance,
Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 65 (1991); Steven L. Schwarcz,
Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008).
Steven Shavell, Liability for Accidents, HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 139,
146–147 (2007); see Balkin, supra note 17, at 1240. Balkin refers to this with regards to
the “levels of decision-making activity” an algorithm takes, and the internalization of the
costs produced by these activities by the business which are operating them.
Catholic Church Welfare Society v. Various Claimants, UKSC 56, 3 WLR 1319
[2012]; BENNETT, supra note 287, at 161.
SHERMAN, P. TECUMSEH, WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAW: “PERSONAL INJURY BY
ACCIDENT ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF THE EMPLOYMENT” 18 (1916).
BENNETT, supra note 287, at 162.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
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work assigned by the employer or engaging in a course of conduct
subject to the employer’s control.” 340 It states further that “[a]n
employee’s act is not within the scope of employment when it occurs
within an independent course of conduct not intended by the employee
to serve any purpose of the employer.” 341 An employer-employee
relationship is a sub-category of an agent-principal relationship and are
therefore applicable to other types of relationships within the agency
framework. 342 In the AI context, the mono-purpose characteristic of AI
agents renders the applicability of the end of this clause in the AI context
void. AI agents lack the ability to act in “an independent course of
conduct not intended to further any purpose of the employer” given the
control its human principal has over its assigned tasks and the lack of a
truly autonomous aspect to its existence. 343
In his article, Bathaee also supports the application of the
respondeat superior doctrine with regards to autonomous AI entities in
light of the black-box problem. 344 However, he limits this application to
certain circumstances, “[w]hen the AI operates autonomously in a
mission-critical setting or one that has a high possibility of externalizing
the risk of failure on others.” 345 However, this conclusion that vicarious
liability will be less appropriate in “less dangerous or mission-critical
settings” is incorrect for two main reasons. 346 First, the differentiation
between these two scenarios is not clear and the possibility of
externalizing the risk of failure on others is high in both situations given
the black-box issue. Second, the risk of chilling “a large swath of
desirable AI applications” is always relevant when AI entities are
involved and is not necessarily more justified in the second set of
circumstances Bathaee describes in light of the first reason mentioned
above. 347 Furthermore, the chilling effect problem (i.e., stifling
innovation) is a major concern in the process of regulating AI liability. 348
However, advocating for no-liability or lowering the liability bar (in the
form of negligence supervision of the principal) will lead to problematic

Id.
Id.
See generally Charles Davant IV, Employer Liability for Employee Fraud: Apparent
Authority or Respondeat Superior, 47 S.D. L. REV. 554 (2002) (explaining respondeat
superior and apparent authority through the employer-employee relationship).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006); see supra
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Part IV, Section C.
Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black Box and the Failure of Intent and
Causation, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 889, 934 (2018).
Id. at 935.
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results in the AI industry that will eventually prevent it from internalizing
its inflicted damages and improving its practices. 349
A terminology note must be made prior to ending this sub-section
about the primary liable party in this vicarious liability context. In a
relationship of a human principal and an AI agent, the latter cannot be
found liable, so technically the principal is not vicariously liable but
rather primarily liable. 350 The distinction between the two does not
matter to the third-party that was injured, but it does matter to the
principal itself when she desires to recoup the damages she paid to the
injured party. 351
This distinction has practical ramifications. For example, a
principal can purchase an insurance policy to protect herself in cases of
vicarious liability but not in cases of “primary liability engendered by
acts of an agent attributed to the principal.” 352 When we discuss an AI
agent, which lacks the ability to assume responsibility over its actions,
the only entity we can claim as responsible is the human principal or
principals pulling its strings. Thus, concepts of primary and vicarious
liability should be treated differently in the AI agent context than in the
case of a human agent. To prove vicarious liability, there is no obligation
to point to an entity which is primarily liable, especially in the AI context
where we know the AI lacks the capability to be held liable. The human
principal or principals will be named as liable and in fact they will be
held primarily liable for the actions of their AI agents.
V. CONCLUSION
AI entities today, and more so in the future, are an essential part
of modern society. 353 They are causing damages and are bound to cause
even more as their integration into our homes and industries increase. 354
Using legal analogies to reason the appropriate liability regime that
should apply on AI entities is a common method for handling new
phenomena in general, and new technologies in particular. 355 However,
choosing the appropriate legal analogy is not a stand-alone decision. It
is influenced by our regulatory purposes and the way we comprehend
AI entities as part of our society.
See supra Part IV, Section B.
See Paulius Cerka, Jurgita Grigiene & Gintare Sirbikyte, Liability for Damages Caused
by Artificial Intelligence, 31 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 376 (2015) (explaining that
349
350

the likelihood of damages caused by AI is real).
BENNETT, supra note 287, at 168.
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352

Id.

Michelle Evans, Artificial Intelligence is Expected to be the Most Impactful
on
Commerce,
FORBES
(Jan.
16,
2019),
www.forbes.com/sites/michelleevans1/2019/01/16/
artificial-intelligence-is-expected-to-be-the-most-impactful-technology-on-commerce/
#51ce92dd3b23 [https://perma.cc/J4KK-DGGT].
See Cerka et al., supra note 350, at 892–93.
Graham, supra note 65, at 1242.
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Treating AI entities as AI agents, which are under the control and
guidance of human principals, is the most accurate analogy we can use
to represent their relationship with our society. This is so given their
mono-purpose feature, the instrumental value they serve in
accomplishing tasks humans assign to them, and the fact all other nonagency legal analogies can be reduced to a three-way agency relationship
(because AI entities are in essence AI judgment-proof agents).
Moreover, even if one does not agree with this legal analogy, the strict
liability regime that stands behind it, in the form of respondeat superior,
is the most appropriate in the AI liability context.
When discussing reflective equilibrium, Rawls stated that “[i]f the
scheme as a whole seems on reflection to clarify and to order our
thoughts, and if it tends to reduce disagreements and to bring divergent
convictions more in line, then it has done all that one may reasonably
ask.” 356 AI entities as AI agents is the theory that accomplishes this
reasonable request and grants us clarity in a very cloudy and
unpredictable field. It is not problem-free, however. Identifying the
appropriate principal or principals is a problem that will need to be
resolved within our judiciary, insurance, and administrative systems, but
it is a manageable and productive problem nonetheless and makes it the
most appropriate theory to follow.
Agents, including AI agents, come in all shapes and sizes and their
utilization under the assumption that their main goal is to provide a
service to a human being is intuitive. This may very well change once we
acknowledge (or realize) they have outgrown that purpose and by doing
so are no longer agents, let alone our agents. This conclusion may also
change in the future if we decide AI entities have reached an intelligence
level which entitles them to new rights and obligations. These two
scenarios will lead to the localization of the agency analogy—once the
technology behind an AI entity changes, the analogy used to describe
them is threatened and the rational that stands behind it is
undermined. 357 This does not necessarily mean the analogy is moot or
erased, but rather it is localized, meaning, it may be applicable with
regards to a specific area within the field, but not with the subject matter
as a whole. 358 This is echoed in Rawls’s reflective equilibrium process
which leads to the localization of some analogies due to the back and
forth reasoning process that changes as AI advances. The localization of

See RAWLS, supra note 7, at 53.
Blavin & Cohen, supra note 48, at 285.
For example, treating the internet as the information superhighway may still be
appropriate with regards to emails, but not the internet as a whole. Blavin & Cohen,
supra note 48, at 269–74.
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the agency analogy will then force us to embark once again on our back
and forth reasoning voyage. 359
If indeed that day comes, 360 and the regulatory purposes that stands
at the basis of the justification for treating AI as agents will be no more,
a new or old legal analogy should be considered. If AI entities will cease
to be judgment-proof agents and will become full transparent agents, the
regulatory structure of agency relationship will be relevant no more and
other non-agency legal analogies, including personhood, could be back
in the race to lead the appropriate liability regime.
But until that day, AI judgment-proof agents will continue to
possess the potential to wreak havoc without the ability of their potential
victims to protect themselves. Holding their human principals strictly
liable for the AI agents’ mischiefs will incentives them to create a safer
environment in today’s algorithmic society, 361 one that is much needed
now, and even more so in the future.

The reflective equilibrium process teaches us that as AI advances and presents more
independent will, older metaphors may become localized. This view is in line with
Blavin and Cohen’s conclusion that metaphors’ future application may become
irrelevant. Blavin & Cohen, supra note 48, at 269–74. For example, treating robots as
property or slaves might be deemed as appropriate for dependable robots of the
previous decade, such as Innvo. Labs robotic dinosaur Pleo and the first generation of
Sony’s dog, AIBO, neither of which possessed the capability to make decisions on their
own. See Geoffrey Fowler, AIBO the Dog will Melt your Heart with Mechanical
Precision,
THE
WASHINGTON
POST
(Sept.
19,
2018),
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/09/18/aibo-robot-dog-will-melt-your-heartwith-mechanical-precision/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.21a6785258c4
[https://perma.cc/59EK-BSLT] (noting that in 2018, Sony released a new and improved
version of AIBO. As of the time of its release, it costs $2,900). Pleo is an animatronic
pet dinosaur toy. For more examples of these types of “basic” robots, see Darling, supra
note 97, at 215. Still, this metaphor is problematic these days given the growing
proficiencies possessed by AI entities, which may lead to a day when we will no longer
set in advance the goals and behavior of AI entities by code alone. Thus, general
principles change over time due to the impact of specific cases and the adoption of new
and better-suited analogies.
See supra Part III, Section B.
Balkin, supra note 17, at 1219.
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